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✦
Abstract—We present a framework for fully-simulatable h-out-of-n
oblivious transfer (OTn
h
) with security against non-adaptive malicious
adversaries. The framework costs six communication rounds and costs
at most 40n public-key operations in computational overhead. Com-
pared with the known protocols for fully-simulatable oblivious transfer
that works in the plain mode (where there is no trusted common
reference string available) and proven to be secure under standard
model (where there is no random oracle available), the instantiation
based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption of the framework is
the most efficient one, no matter seen from communication rounds or
computational overhead.
Our framework uses three abstract tools, i.e., perfectly binding com-
mitment, perfectly hiding commitment and our new smooth projective
hash. This allows a simple and intuitive understanding of its security.
We instantiate the new smooth projective hash under the lattice
assumption, the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, the decisional N -
th residuosity assumption, the decisional quadratic residuosity assump-
tion. This indeed shows that the folklore that it is technically difficult to
instantiate the projective hash framework under the lattice assumption
is not true. What’s more, by using this lattice-based hash and lattice-
based commitment scheme, we gain a concrete protocol for OTn
h
which
is secure against quantum algorithms.
Index Terms—oblivious transfer (OT) protocols.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Oblivious transfer
O BLIVIOUS transfer (OT), first introduced by [49] andlater defined in another way with equivalent effect
[16] by [18], is a fundamental primitive in cryptography
and a concrete problem in the filed of secure multi-party
computation. Considerable cryptographic protocols can
be built from it. Most remarkable, [27], [31], [34], [56]
proves that any secure multi-party computation can be
based on a secure oblivious transfer protocol. In this
paper, we concern a variant of OT, h-out-of-n oblivious
transfer (OT nh ). OT
n
h deals with the following scenario.
A sender holds n private messages m1,m2, . . . ,mn. A
receiver holds h private positive integers i1, i2, . . . , ih,
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where i1 < i2 < . . . < ih 6 n. The receiver expects to
get the messages mi1 ,mi2 , . . . ,mih without leaking any
information about his private input, i.e., the h positive
integers he holds. The sender expects all new knowledge
learned by the receiver from their interaction is at most
h messages. Obviously, the OT most literature refer to is
OT 21 and can be viewed as a special case of OT
n
h .
Considering a variety of attack we have to confront
in real environment, a protocol for OT nh with security
against malicious adversaries (a malicious adversary
may act in any arbitrary malicious way to learn as much
extra information as possible) is more desirable than
the one with security against semi-honest adversaries
(a semi-honest adversary, on one side, honestly does
everything told by a prescribed protocol; on one side,
records the messages he sees to deduce extra information
which is not supposed to be known to he). Using Goldre-
ich’s compiler [24], [27], we can gain the former version
from the corresponding latter version. However, the
resulting protocol is prohibitive expensive for practical
use, because it is embedded with so many invocations
of zero-knowledge for NP. Thus, directly constructing
the protocol based on specific intractability assumptions
seems more feasible.
The first step in this direction is independently made
by [44] and [1] which respectively presents a two-
round efficient protocol for OT 21 based on the decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Starting from these
works and using the tool smooth projective hashing,
[32] abstracts and generalizes the ideas of [1], [44] to
a framework for OT 21 . Besides DDH assumption, the
framework can be instantiated under the decisional N -th
residuosity (DNR) assumption and decisional quadratic
residuosity (DQR) assumption [32].
Unfortunately, these protocols (or frameworks) are
only half-simulatable not fully-simulatable. By saying a
protocol is fully-simulatable, we means that the protocol
can be strictly proven its security under the real/ideal
model simulation paradigm. The paradigm requires that
for any adversary in the real world, there exists a corre-
sponding adversary simulating him in the ideal world.
Thus, the real adversary can not do more harm than
the corresponding ideal adversary does. Therefore the
security level of the protocol is guaranteed not to be
lower than that of the ideal world. Undesirably, a half-
2simulatable protocol for OT 21 only provides a simulator
in the case the receiver is corrupted such as [1], [44] or
in the case the sender is corrupted such as [32].
Considering security, requiring a protocol to be fully-
simulatable is necessary. Specifically, a fully-simulatable
protocol provides security against all kinds of attacks,
especially the future unknown attacks taken by any
adversary whose computational resource is fixed when
constructing the protocol (generally, it is assumed that
the adversaries run arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-
time) [7], [24], while a not fully-simulatable protocol
doesn’t. For example, the protocols proposed by [1],
[32], [44] suffer the selective-failure attacks, in which a
malicious sender can induce transfer failures that are
dependent on the messages that the receiver requests
[45].
Constructing fully-simulatable protocols for OT with
security against malicious adversaries naturally becomes
the focus of the research community. [6] first presents
such a fully-simulatable protocol. In detail, the OT is an
adaptive h-out-n oblivious transfer (denoted by OT nh×1
in related literature) and based on q-Power Decisional
Diffie-Hellman and q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assump-
tions. Unfortunately, these two assumptions are not stan-
dard assumptions used in cryptography and seem signif-
icantly stronger than DDH, DQR and so on. Motivated
by basing OT on weaker complexity assumption, [28]
presents a protocol for OT nh using a blind identity-based
encryption which is based on decisional bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DBDH) assumption. Using cut-choose tech-
nique, [36] later presents two efficient protocols for fully-
simulatable OT 21 respectively based on DDH assumption
and DNR assumption, where the DDH-based protocol
is the most efficient one among these fully-simulatable
works.
The protocols mentioned above are proved their se-
curities in the plain stand-alone model which not nec-
essarily allows concurrent composition with other arbi-
trary malicious protocols. [48] overcomes this weakness
and further the research by presenting a framework
under common reference string (CRS) model for fully-
simulatable, universally composable OT 21 and instan-
tiating the framework respectively under DDH, DQR
and worst-case lattice assumption. It is notable that
conditioning on a trusted CRS is available, the DDH-
based instantiation of the framework is the most efficient
protocol for OT 21 no matter seen from the number of
communication rounds or the computational overhead.
Recently, [20], using a novel compiler and somewhat
non-committing encryption they present, convert [48]’s
instantiations based on DDH, DQR to the corresponding
protocols with higher security level. In more detail, the
resulting protocols for OT 21 are secure against adaptive
malicious adversaries, which corrupts the parties dy-
namically based on his knowledge gathered so far. Note
that, the fully-simulatable protocols for OT 21 mentioned
so far except the one presented by [6] are only secure
against non-adaptive malicious adversaries, which only
corrupts the parties preset before the running of the
protocol.
Though constructing protocols for fully-simulatable
OT 21 with security against malicious adversaries has
been studied well, constructing protocols for such OT nh
hasn’t. We note that there are some works aiming to ex-
tend known cryptographic protocols to OT nh . [42] shows
how to implementation OT nh using logn invocation of
OT 21 under half-simulation. A similar implementation
for adaptive OT nh can be seen in [43]. What’s more, the
same authors of [42], [43] propose a way to transform a
singe-server private-information retrieval scheme (PIR)
into an oblivious transfer scheme under half-simulation
too [45]. With the help of a random oracle, [30] shows
how to extend k oblivious transfers (for some security
parameter k) into many more, without much additional
effort. However, the Random Oracle Model is risky.
First, [10] shows that a scheme is secure in the Random
Oracle Model does not necessarily imply that a particular
implementation of it (in the real world) is secure, or even
that this scheme does not have any ”structural flaws”.
Second, [10] shows efficient implementing the random
oracle is impossible. Later, [35] finds that the random-
oracle instantiations proposed by Bellare and Rogaway
from 1993 and 1996, and the ones implicit in IEEE
P1363 and PKCS standards are weaker than a random
oracle. What is worse, [35] shows that how the hash
function defects deadly damages the securities of the
cryptographic schemes presented in [4], [5]. Therefore, in
this paper, we only consider the schemes which are fully-
simulatable and without turning to a random oracle.
To our best knowledge, only [6] and [28] respectively
present such fully-simulatable protocols for OT nh . How-
ever, the assumptions the former uses are not standard
and the latter uses is too expensive. Therefore, a well-
motivated problem is to find a protocol or framework
for efficient, fully-simulatable, secure against malicious
adversaries OT nh under weaker complexity assumptions.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we present a framework for efficient,
fully-simulatable, secure against non-adaptive malicious
adversaries OT nh whose security is proven under stand
model (i.e., without turning to a random oracle). To our
best knowledge, this is the first framework for such OT nh .
The framework have the following features,
1) Fully-simulatable and secure against malicious ad-
versaries without using a CRS. [32]’s framework for
OT 21 is half-simulatable. Thought [48]’s framework
for OT 21 is fully-simulatable, it doesn’t work with-
out a CRS. What is more, how to provide a trusted
CRS before the protocol run still is a unsolved
problem. The existing possible solutions, such as
natural process suggested by [48], are only con-
jectures without formal proofs. The same problem
remains in its adaptive version presented by [20].
What is worse, [9], [11] show that even given a
3authenticated communication channel, implement-
ing a universal composable protocol providing
useful trusted CRS in the presence of malicious
adversaries is impossible. Therefore, considering
practical use, our framework are better.
2) Efficient. Compared with the existing protocols for
fully-simulatable OT that without resorting to a
CRS or a random oracle, i.e., the protocols pre-
sented by [6], [28], [36], the DDH-based instantia-
tion of our framework costs the minimum number
of communication rounds and costs the minimum
computational overhead. Please see Section 4.4 and
Section 4.5 for the detailed comparisons.
We admit that, in the context of a trusted CRS is
available and only OT 21 is needed, the DDH-based
instantiation of [48] is the most efficient one.
3) Abstract and modular. The framework is described
using just three high-level cryptographic tools, i.e.,
perfectly binding commitment (PBC), perfectly hid-
ing commitment (PHC) and our new smooth pro-
jective hash (denoted by SPHDHCt,h for simplic-
ity). This allows a simple and intuitive understand-
ing of its security.
4) Generally realizable. The high-level cryptographic
tools PBC, PHC and SPHDHCt,h are realizable
from a variety of known specific assumptions,
even future assumptions maybe. This makes our
framework generally realizable. In particular, we
instantiate SPHDHCt,h from the DDH assump-
tion, the DNR assumption, the DQR assumption
and the lattice assumption. Instantiating PBC or
PHC under specific assumptions is beyond the
scope of this paper. Please see [23], [26] for such
examples. Generally realizability is vital to make
the framework live long, considering the future
progress in breaking a specific intractable prob-
lem. If this case happen, replacing the instantiation
based on the broken problem with that based on a
unbroken problem suffices.
What is more, we fix a folklore [36] that it appears
technically difficult to instantiate the projective hash
under lattice assumption by presenting a lattice-based
SPHDHCt,h instantiation. It is notable that we gain
an OT nh instantiation which is secure against quan-
tum algorithms, using this lattice-based SPHDHCt,h
instantiation and appropriate lattice-based commitment
schemes. Considering that factoring integers and finding
discrete logarithms are efficiently feasible for quantum
algorithms [52]–[54], this is an example showing the ben-
efits from the generally realizability of the framework.
As an independent contribution, we present several
propositions/lemmas related to the indistinguishability
of probability ensembles defined by sampling polyno-
mial instances. Such propositions/lemmas simplify our
security proof very much. We believe that they are as
useful in security proof somewhere else as in this paper.
1.3 Our Approach
We note that the smooth projective hash is a good
abstract tool. Using this tool, [32] in fact presents a frame-
work for half-simulatable OT 21 , [21] present a framework
for password-based authenticated key exchange proto-
cols. We also note that the cut-and-choose is a good
technique to make protocol fully-simulatable. Using this
tool, [36] present several fully-simulatable protocol for
OT 21 , [37] presents a general fully-simulatable protocol
for two-party computation. Indeed, we are inspired by
such works. Our basic ideal is to use cut-and-choose
technique and smooth projective hash to get a fully-
simulatable framework.
Loosely speaking, a smooth projective hash (SPH) is a
set of operations defined over two languages L˙ and L¨,
where L˙ ∩ L¨ = ∅. For any projective instance x˙ ∈ L˙,
there are two ways to obtain its hash value, i.e., the
way using its hash key or the way using its projective
key and its witness w˙. For any smooth instance x¨ ∈ L¨,
there is only one way to obtain its hash value, i.e., the
way using its hash key. The version of SPH presented
by [32] (denoted by V SPHH for simplicity) holds a
property called verifiable smoothness that can judge
whether at least one of arbitrary two instances is smooth.
Another property V SPHH holds, called hard subset
membership, makes sure x¨ and x˙ are computationally
indistinguishable.
We observe that the V SPHH indeed is easy to be
extended to deal with OT n1 , but seems difficult to be
extended to deal with the general OT nh . The reason
is that, to hold verifiable smoothness, x˙s and x¨s have
to be generated in a dependent way. This makes the
verifiable smoothness for multiple x˙s and multiple x¨s
(i.e., judge whether at least n−h of arbitrary n instances
are smooth) difficult to hold without leaking information
which is conductive to distinguish such x˙s and x¨s. We
also observe that, there is no way to construct a fully-
simulatable framework using V SPHH , because there is
no way to extract the real input of the adversary in the
case that the receiver is corrupted.
We define a new smooth projective hash called t-
smooth h-projective hash family that holds proper-
ties distinguishability, hard subset membership, feasible
cheating (denoted by SPHDHCt,h for simplicity). The
key solution in SPHDHCt,h to the mentioned problems
is that requiring each x¨ to hold a witness too. This solu-
tion enables us to generate x˙s and x¨s in a independent
way. Correspondingly, the verifiable smoothness is not
needed any more and replaced by a property called
distinguishability, which provides a way to distinguish
x˙s and x¨s if their witnesses are given.
Since the receiver encodes his input as a permutation
of x˙s and x¨s, a simulator can the extract the real input of
the adversary in the case that the receiver is corrupted if
their witnesses are available. Combining the application
of the technique cut-and-choose, a simulator can see such
witnesses by rewinding the adversary. To extract the
4real input of the adversary in the case that the sender
is corrupted, the property feasible cheating provides
way to cheat out of the real input of the adversary.
Naturally, all the properties and the correlated algorithm
in SPHDHCt,h are extended to deal with n instances
rather than only 2 instances. Please see Section 3.2 for a
detailed comparison this new hash with previous hash
systems.
We show that constructing SPHDHCt,h can be re-
duced to constructing considerably simpler hash sys-
tems. Our lattice-based SPHDHCt,h instantiation is
builded on the lattice-based cryptosystem presented by
[36]. It is noticeable that it appears difficult to get lattice-
based instantiation for SPH [36]. Our solution is to let
the instance x (x ∈ L˙ ∪ L¨) be available to the algorithm
that is responsible for generating pair of the hash key
and the projective key. The other three intractability-
assumption-based SPHDHCt,h instantiations can be ul-
timately built from known SPH schemes such as that
presented by [32] with necessary modifications.
Using SPHDHCt,h we construct the framework de-
scribed with high-level as follows .
1) The receiver generates hash parameters and appro-
priate many instance vectors, then sends them to
the sender after disordering each vector.
2) The receiver and the sender cooperate to toss coin
to decide which vector to be opened.
3) The receiver opens the chosen instances, encodes
his private input by reordering each unchosen vec-
tor and sends the resulting code, which in fact is a
sequence of permutations, to the sender.
4) The sender checks that the chosen vectors are
generated in the legal way which guarantees that
the receiver learns at most h message. If the check
pass, the sender encrypts his private input (i.e.,
the n messages he holds) using the hash values
of the instances of the unchosen vectors in the way
indicated by the code of receiver’s private input,
and sends the ciphertexts together with some auxil-
iary information (i.e., the projective hash keys) that
is conductive to decrypt some ciphertexts to the
receiver.
5) The receiver decrypts the ciphertexts with the help
of the auxiliary information and gains the messages
he expects.
Intuitively speaking, the receiver’s security is im-
plied by the property hard subset membership of
SPHDHCt,h. This property guarantees that the receiver
can securely encode his private input by reordering each
unchosen instance vector. The sender’s security is im-
plied by the cut-and-choose technique, which guarantees
that the probability that the adversaries controlling a cor-
rupted receiver learns extra new knowledge is negligible.
1.4 Organization
In Section 2, we describe the notations used in this
paper, the security definition of OT nh , the definition of
commitment scheme. In Section 3, we define our new
hash system, i.e., SPHDHCt,h. In Section 4, we con-
struct our framework. In Section 5, we prove the security
of the framework. In Section 6, we reduce constructing
SPHDHCt,h to constructing considerably simpler hash
systems. In Section 7, we instantiate SPHDHCt,h under
the lattice, DDH, DNR, DQR assumptions, respectively.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Most notations and concepts mentioned in this section
originate from [7], [23], [24] which are basic literature
in the filed of secure multi-party computation (SMPC).
We tailor them to the need of dealing with OT nh .
2.1 Basic Notations
We denote an unspecified positive polynomial by poly(.).
We denote the set consists of all natural numbers by N.
For any i ∈ N, [i] def= {1, 2, . . . , i}. We denote the set
consists of all prime numbers by P.
We denote security parameter used to measure secu-
rity and complexity by k. A function µ(.) is negligible
in k, if there exists a positive constant integer n0, for
any poly(.) and any k which is greater than n0 (for
simplicity, we later call such k sufficiently large k), it
holds that µ(k) < 1/poly(k). A probability ensemble
X
def
= {X(1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ is an infinite sequence of
random variables indexed by (k, a), where a represents
various types of inputs used to sample the instances
according to the distribution of the random variable
X(1k, a). Probability ensemble X is polynomial-time
constructible, if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) sample algorithm SX(.) such that for any a,
any k, the random variables SX(1
k, a) and X(1k, a) are
identically distributed. We denote sampling an instance
according to X(1k, a) by α← SX(1k, a).
Let X
def
= {X(1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ and Y def=
{Y (1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ be two probability ensembles.
They are computationally indistinguishable, denoted
X
c
= Y , if for any non-uniform PPT algorithm D with
an infinite auxiliary information sequence z = (zk)k∈N
(where each zk ∈ {0, 1}∗), there exists a negligible
function µ(.) such that for any sufficiently large k, any
a, it holds that
|Pr(D(1k, X(1k, a), a, zk) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, Y (1k, a), a, zk) = 1)| 6 µ(k)
They are same, denoted X = Y , if for any sufficiently
large k, any a, X(1k, a) and Y (1k, a) are defined in the
same way. They are equal, denoted X ≡ Y , if for any
sufficiently large k, any a, the distributions of X(1k, a)
and Y (1k, a) are identical. Obviously, if X = Y then X ≡
Y ; If X ≡ Y then X c= Y .
Let ~x be a vector (note that arbitrary binary string can
be viewed as a vector). We denote its i-th element by
~x〈i〉, denote its dimensionality by #~x, denote its length
5in bits by |~x|. For any positive integers set I , any vector
~x, ~x〈I〉 def= (~x〈i〉)i∈I,i≤#~x.
Let M be a probabilistic (interactive) Turing machine.
By Mr(.) we denote M ’s output generated at the end of
an execution using randomness r.
Let f : D → R. Let D′ ⊆ {0, 1}∗. Then f(D′) def=
{f(x)|x ∈ D′ ∩D}, Range(f) def= f(D).
Let x ∈χ Y denotes sampling an instance x from do-
main Y according to the distribution law (or probability
density function ) χ. Specifically, let x ∈U Y denotes
uniformly sampling an instance x from domain Y .
2.2 Security Definition Of A Protocol For OT nh
2.2.1 Functionality Of OT nh
OT nh involves two parties, party P1 (i.e., the sender)
and party P2 (i.e., the receiver). OT
n
h ’s functionality is
formally defined as follows
f : N× {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗
f(1k, ~m,H) = (λ, ~m〈H〉)
where
• k is the public security parameter.
• ~m ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n is P1’s private input, and each |~m〈i〉|
is the same.
• H ∈ Ψ def= {B|B ⊆ [n], #B = h} is P2’s private
input.
• λ denotes a empty string and is supposed to be got
by P1. That is, P1 is supposed to get nothing.
• ~m〈H〉 is supposed to be got by P2.
Note that, the length of all parties’ private input have
to be identical in SMPC (please see [24] for the reason
and related discussion). This means that |~m| = |H | is
required. Without loss of generality, in this paper, we
assume |~m| = |H | always holds, because padding can be
easily used to meet such requirement.
Intuitively speaking, the security of OT nh requires that
P1 can’t learn any new knowledge — typically, P2’s
private input, from the interaction at all, and P2 can’t
learn more than h messages held by P1. To capture the
security in a formal way, the concepts such as adver-
sary, trusted third party, ideal world, real world were
introduced. Note that the security target in this paper is
to be secure against non-adaptive malicious adversaries,
so only concepts related to this case is referred to in the
following.
2.2.2 Non-Adaptive Malicious Adversary
Before running OT nh , the adversary A has to corrupt all
parties listed in I ⊆ [2]. In the case that U ∈ {P1, P2}
is not corrupted, U will strictly follow the prescribed
protocol as an honest party. In the case that party U is
corrupted, U will be fully controlled by A as a corrupted
party. In this case, U will have to pass all his knowledge
to A before the protocol runs and follows A’s instructions
from then on — so there is a probability that U arbitrarily
deviates from prescribed protocol. In fact, afterA finishes
corrupting, A and all corrupted parties have formed a
coalition led by A to learn as much extra knowledge,
e.g. the honest parties’ private inputs, as possible. From
then on, they share knowledge with each other and
coordinate their behavior. Without loss of generality,
we can view this coalition as follows. All corrupted
parties are dummy. A receives messages addressed to the
members of the coalition and sends messages on behalf
of the members.
Loosely speaking, we say OT nh is secure, if and only if,
for any malicious adversary A, the knowledge A learns
in the real world is not more than that he learns in the
ideal world. In other words, if and only if, for any mali-
cious adversary A, what harm A can do in real world is
not more than what harm he can do in the ideal world.
In the ideal world, there is an incorruptible trusted third
party (TTP). All parties hand their private inputs to TTP.
TTP computes f and sends back f(.)〈i〉 to Pi. In the real
world, there is no TTP, and the computation of f(.) is
finished by A and all parties’ interactions.
2.2.3 OT nh In The Ideal World
In the ideal world, an execution of OT nh proceeds as
follows.
Initial Inputs. All entities know the public security
parameter k. P1 holds a private input ~m ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n.
Party P2 holds a private input H ∈ Ψ. Adversary A
holds a name list I ⊆ [2], a randomness rA ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
an infinite auxiliary input sequence z = (zk)k∈N, where
zk ∈ {0, 1}∗. Before proceeds to next stage, A corrupts
parties listed in I and learns ~x〈I〉, where ~x def= (~m,H).
Submitting inputs to TTP. Each honest party Pi always
submits its private input ~x〈i〉 unchanged to TTP. A
submits arbitrary string based on his knowledge to TTP
for the corrupted parties. The string TTP receives is a
two-dimensional vector ~y which is formally described
as follows.
~y〈i〉 =
{
~x〈i〉 if i /∈ I ,
α if i ∈ I
where α ∈ {~x〈i〉} ∪ {0, 1}|~x〈i〉| ∪ {aborti} and α ←
A(1k, I, rA, zk, ~x〈I〉). Obviously, there is a probability
that ~x 6= ~y.
TTP computing f . TTP checks that ~y is a valid input to
f , i.e., no entry of ~y is of the form aborti. If ~y passes the
check, then TTP computes f and sets ~w to be f(1k, ~y).
Otherwise, TTP sets ~w to be (aborti, aborti). Finally, for
each i ∈ [n] TTP hands ~w〈i〉 to each Pi respectively and
halts.
Outputs. Each honest party Pi always outputs the
message ~w〈i〉 it obtains from the TTP. Each corrupted
party Pi outputs nothing (i.e., λ). The adversary outputs
something generated by executing arbitrary function of
the information he gathers so far. Without loss of gener-
ality, this can be assumed to be (1k, I, rA, zk, ~x〈I〉, ~w〈I〉).
6The output of the whole execution in the ideal world,
denoted by Idealf,I,A(zk)(1
k, ~m,H), is defined by the out-
puts of all parties and that of the adversary as follows.
Idealf,A(z),I(1
k, ~x, rA)〈i〉
def
=

A’s output, i.e., (1k, I, rA,
zk, ~x〈I〉, ~w〈I〉), i = 0;
Pi’s output, i.e., λ, i ∈ I;
Pi’s output, i.e., ~w〈i〉, i ∈ [n]− I.
Obviously, Idealf,A(z),I(1
k, ~x) is a random variable
whose randomness is rA.
2.2.4 OT nh In The Real World
In the real world, there is no TTP. A execution of OT nh
proceeds as follows.
Initial Inputs. Initial input each entity holds in the real
world is the same as in the ideal world but there are
some difference as follows. A randomness ri is held by
each party Pi. After finishes corrupting, in addition to
the knowledge A learns in ideal world, the corrupted
parties’ randomness ~r〈I〉 is also learn by A, where ~r def=
(r1, r2).
Computing f . In the real world, computing f is
finished by all entities’ interaction. Each honest party
strictly follows the prescribed protocol (i.e., the concrete
protocol, usually denoted π , for OT nh ). The corrupted
parties have to follow A’s instructions and may arbitrar-
ily deviate from prescribed protocol.
Outputs. Each honest party Pi always outputs what
the prescribed protocol instructs. Each corrupted party
Pi outputs nothing. The adversary outputs something
generated by executing arbitrary function of the in-
formation he gathers so far. Without loss of general-
ity, this can be assumed to be a string consisting of
1k, I, rA, ~r〈I〉, zk, ~x〈I〉 and messages addressed to the
corrupted parties.
The output of the whole execution in the real world,
denoted by Realπ,I,A(zk)(1
k, ~m,H, rA, ~r), is defined by
the outputs of all parties and that of the adversary as
follows.
Realπ,I,A(zk)(1
k, ~m,H, rA, ~r)〈i〉
def
=

A′s output, i.e., (1k, I, rA,
~r〈I〉, zk, ~x〈I〉,msgI), i = 0;
P ′is output, i.e., λ, i ∈ I;
P ′i s output, i.e., what
instructed by π,
i ∈ [n]− I.
Obviously, Realπ,I,A(zk)(1
k, ~m,H) is a random variable
whose randomnesses are rA and ~r.
2.2.5 Security Definition
The security of a protocol for OT nh is formally captured
by the following definition.
Definition 1 (The security of a protocol for OT nh ). Let
f denotes the functionality of OT nh and let π be a concrete
protocol for OT nh . We say π securely computes f , if and only if
for any non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A with an infinite sequence z = (zk)k∈N in the real world,
there exists a non-uniform probabilistic expected polynomial-
time adversary A′ with the same sequence in the ideal world
such that, for any I ⊆ [2], it holds that
{Realπ,I,A(zk)(1k, ~m,H)}k∈N, ~m∈({0,1}∗)n
H∈Ψ,zk∈{0,1}∗
c
=
{Idealf,I,A′(zk)(1k, ~m,H)}k∈N, ~m∈({0,1}∗)n
H∈Ψ,zk∈{0,1}∗
(1)
where the parameters input to the two probability ensembles
are same and each ~m〈i〉 is of the same length. The adversary
A’ in the ideal world is called a simulator of the adversary A
in the real world.
The concept, non-uniform probabilistic expected
polynomial-time, mentioned in Definition 1 is formu-
lated in distinct way in distinct literature such as [8],
[23]. We prefer to the following definition [33], because
it is clearer in formulation and more closely related to
our issue.
Definition 2 (M1 runs in expected polynomial–
time with respect to M2). Let M1,M2 be two in-
teractive Turing machines running a protocol. By <
M1(x1, r1, z1),M2(x2, r2, z2) > (1
k), we denote a running
which starts withMi holding a private input xi, a randomness
ri, an auxiliary input zi, the public security parameter k. By
IDNM1(< M1(x1, r1, z1),M2(x2, r2, z2) > (1
k)), we denote
the number of total direct deduction steps M1 takes in the
whole running. We say M1 runs in expected polynomial-time
with respect to M2, if and only if there exists a polynomial
poly(.) such that for every k ∈ N, it holds that
max({ER1,R2(IDNM1(< M1(x1, R1, z1),
M2(x2, R2, z2) > (1
k)))|
|x1| = |x2| = k, z1, z2 ∈ {0, 1}∗}) ≤ poly(k)
where R1, R2 are random variables with uniform distribution
over {0, 1}∗.
For Definition 1, it in fact requires that adversary A’s
simulator A′ should run in expected polynomial-time
with respect to TTP who computes OT nh ’s functionality
f .
We point out that the security definition presented in
[7], [23], [24] requires the simulator A′ to run in strictly
polynomial-time, but the one presented in [8], [36], [37]
allow A′ to run in expected polynomial-time. Definition
1 follows the latter. We argue that this is justified, since
[3] shows that there is no (non-trivial) constant-round
zero-knowledge proof or argument having a strictly
polynomial-time black-box simulator, which means al-
lowing simulator to run in expected polynomial-time
is essential for achieving constant-round protocols. See
[33] for further discussion.
72.3 Commitment Scheme
In this section, we briefly introduce the cryptographic
tool commitment scheme which will be used in our
framework. For the strict definition and the details,
please see [23] or [26].
Definition 3 (commitment scheme, non-strict descrip-
tion, [23], [26]). A commitment scheme is a two-party
protocol involving two phases.
• Initial Inputs. At the beginning, all parties know the pub-
lic security parameter k. The unbounded sender P1 holds
a randomness r1 ∈ {0, 1}∗, a value m ∈ {0, 1}poly(k) to
be committed to, where the polynomial poly(.) is public.
The PPT receiver P2 holds a randomness r2 ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• Commit Phase. P1 computes a commitment, denoted α,
based on his knowledge, i.e., α← P1(1k,m, r1), then P1
send α to P2.
– The security for P1 is implied by the property compu-
tationally hiding, which prevents P2 from knowledge
of the value committed by P1. That is, for any PPT
P2, any m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1}poly(k), it holds that
{V iewCP2(< P1(m), P2 > (1k))}k∈N
c
= {V iewCP2(< P1(m′), P2 > (1k))}k∈N,
where V iewCP2(.) denotes P2’s view in commit
phase.
• Reveal Phase. P1 computes and sends a de-commitment,
which typically consists of m, r1, to P2 to let P2 know
m. Receiving de-commitment, P2 checks its validity.
Typically P2 checks that α = P1(1
k,m, r1) holds. If de-
commitment pass the check, P2 knows and accepts m.
– The security for P2 is implied by the property
perfectly binding, which guarantees that for any
unbounded P1, any m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1}poly(k) such
that m1 6= m2, the probability that P2 accepts
m2 while P1 commits to m1 is zero, where the
probability is taken only over the randomness used
by P2.
The above definition defines perfectly binding com-
mitment schemes (denoted by PBC). Relaxing the prop-
erty binding to allow the probability of successful cheat
of unbounded P1 to be negligible, then the above def-
inition defines statically binding commitment schemes.
Correspondingly, in the setting that P1 is PPT and P2
is unbounded, there exists perfectly hiding commit-
ment schemes (denoted by PHC) and statically hid-
ing commitment schemes, which provide perfectly hid-
ing and statically hiding to P1 respectively, and only
computationally binding to P2. If a property is secure
against unbounded adversaries, we say this property is
information-theoretically secure. We remark that there
is no commitment scheme holding both information-
theoretically binding and information-theoretically hid-
ing.
3 A NEW SMOOTH PROJECTIVE HASH -
SPHDHCt,h
3.1 The Definition Of SPHDHCt,h
In this section, we define a new smooth projective hash
— t-smooth h-projective hash family that holds proper-
ties distinguishability, hard subset membership, feasible
cheating, denoted SPHDHCt,h for simplicity, which will
be used to construct our framework for OT nh . In section
7, we instantiate SPHDHCt,h respectively under four
distinct intractability assumptions.
Let us recall some related works before defining
SPHDHCt,h. [12], [55] present the classic notation
of ”universal hashing”. Based on ”universal hashing”,
[15] first introduces the concept of universal projective
hashing, smooth projective hashing and hard subset
membership problem in terms of languages and sets.
In order to construct a framework for password-based
authenticated key exchange, [21] modifies such defini-
tion to some extent. That is, smoothness is defined over
every instance of a language rather than a randomly
chosen instance. [32] refines the modified version in
terms of the procedures used to implement it. What is
more, a new requirement called verifiable smoothness is
added to the hashing so as to construct a framework for
OT 21 . The resulting hashing is called verifiablely-smooth
projective hash family that has hard subset membership
property (denoted by V SPHH for simplicity). Note
that, the framework presented by [32] is not fully-
simulatable. The difference between SPHDHCt,h and
the works mentioned above will be under a detailed
discussion after we define SPHDHCt,h.
For clarity in presentation, we assume n = h + t
always holds and introduce additional notations. Let
R = {(x,w)|x,w ∈ {0, 1}∗} be a relation, then LR def=
{x|x ∈ {0, 1}∗, ∃w((x,w) ∈ R)}, R(x) def= {w|(x,w) ∈ R}.
Π
def
= {π|π : [n]→ [n], π is a permutation}. Let π ∈ Π (to
comply with other literature, we also use π somewhere
to denote a protocol without bringing any confusion).
Let ~x be an arbitrary vector. By π(~x), we denote a vector
resulted from applying π to ~x. That is, ~y = π(~x), if and
only if ∀i(i ∈ [d] → ~x〈i〉 = ~y〈π(i)〉) ∧ ∀i(i /∈ [d] → ~x〈i〉 =
~y〈i〉) holds, where d def= min(#~x, n).
Definition 4 (t-smooth h-projective hash family
that holds properties distinguishability, hard
subset membership and feasible cheating).
H = (PG, IS,DI,KG,Hash, pHash,Cheat) is an
t-smooth h-projective hash family that holds properties
distinguishability, hard subset membership and feasible
cheating (SPHDHCt,h), if and only if H is specified as
follows
• The parameter-generator PG is a PPT algorithm that
takes a security parameter k as input and outputs a
family parameter Λ, i.e., Λ ← PG(1k). Λ will be used
as a parameter to define three relations RΛ, R˙Λ and R¨Λ,
where RΛ = R˙Λ ∪ R¨Λ. Moreover, R˙Λ ∩ R¨Λ = ∅ are
supposed to hold.
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security parameter k, a family parameter Λ as input and
outputs a vector ~a, i.e., ~a← IS(1k,Λ).
Let ~a = ((x˙1, w˙1), . . . , (x˙h, w˙h), (x¨h+1, w¨h+1), . . . ,
(x¨n, w¨n))
T be a vector generated by IS. We call each x˙i
or x¨i an instance of LRΛ . For each pair (x˙i, w˙i) (resp.,
(x¨i, w¨i)), w˙i (resp., w¨i) is called a witness of x˙i ∈ LR˙Λ
(resp., x¨i ∈ LR¨Λ). Note that, by this way we indeed
have defined the relationship RΛ, R˙Λ and R¨Λ here. The
properties smoothness and projection we will mention
later make sure R˙Λ ∩ R¨Λ = ∅ holds.
For simplicity in formulation later, we introduce
some additional notations here. For ~a mentioned
above, ~x~a
def
= (x˙1, . . . , x˙h, x¨h+1, . . . , x¨n)
T ,
~w~a
def
= (w˙1, . . . , w˙h, w¨h+1, . . . , w¨n)
T . What is more,
we abuse notation ∈ to some extent. We write
~x ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ)) if and only if there exists a
vector ~x~a such that ~x~a = ~x and ~a ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ)).
We write x ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ)) if and only if there
exists a vector ~x such that ~x ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ)) and
x is an entry of ~x.
• The distinguisher DI is a PPT algorithm that takes a
security parameter k, a family parameter Λ and a pair
strings (x,w) as input and outputs an indicator bit b,
i.e., b← DI(1k,Λ, x, w).
• The key generator KG is a PPT algorithm that takes
a security parameter k, a family parameter Λ and an
instance x as input and outputs a hash key and a
projection key, i.e., (hk, pk)← KG(1k,Λ, x).
• The hash Hash is a PPT algorithm that takes a security
parameter k, a family parameter Λ, an instance x and a
hash key hk as input and outputs a value y, i.e., y ←
Hash(1k,Λ, x, hk).
• The projection pHash is a PPT algorithm that takes a
security parameter k, a family parameter Λ, an instance
x, a witness w of x and a projection key pk as input and
outputs a value y, i.e., y ← pHash(1k,Λ, x, pk, w).
• The cheat Cheat is a PPT algorithm that takes a se-
curity parameter k, a family parameter Λ as input and
outputs n elements of R˙Λ, i.e., ((x˙1, w˙1), . . . (x˙n, w˙n))←
Cheat(1k,Λ).
and H has the following properties
1) Projection. Intuitively speaking, it requires that for any
instance x˙ ∈ LR˙Λ , the hash value of x˙ is obtainable with
the help of its witness w˙. That is, for any sufficiently
large k, any Λ ∈ Range(PG(1k)), any (x˙, w˙) generated
by IS(1k,Λ), any (hk, pk) ∈ Range(KG(1k,Λ, x˙)), it
holds that
Hash(1k,Λ, x˙, hk) = pHash(1k,Λ, x˙, pk, w˙)
2) Smoothness. Intuitively speaking, it requires that for any
instance vector ~¨x ∈ Lt
R¨Λ
, the hash values of ~¨x are ran-
dom and unobtainable unless their hash keys are known.
That is, for any π ∈ Π, the two probability ensembles
Sm1
def
= {Sm1(1k)}k∈N and Sm2 def= {Sm2(1k)}k∈N,
defined as follows, are computationally indistinguish-
able, i.e., Sm1
c
= Sm2.
SmGen1(1
k): Λ← PG(1k), ~a← IS(1k,Λ), ~x← ~x~a,
for each j ∈ [n] operates as follows: (hkj , pkj) ←
KG(1k,Λ, ~x〈j〉), yj ← Hash(1k,Λ, ~x〈j〉, hkj),−−−→
xpky〈j〉 ← (~x〈j〉, pkj , yj). Finally outputs (Λ,−−−→xpky).
SmGen2(1
k): compared with SmGen1(1
k), the only
difference is that for each j ∈ [n] − [h], yj ∈U
Range(Hash(1k,Λ, ~x〈j〉, .)).
Smi(1
k): (Λ,
−−−→
xpky) ← SmGeni(1k), −˜−−→xpky ←
π(
−−−→
xpky), finally outputs (Λ,
−˜−−→
xpky).
3) Distinguishability. Intuitively speaking, it requires that
the DI can distinguish the projective instances and
smooth instances with the help of their witnesses. That
is, it requires that the DI correctly computes the follow-
ing function.
ζ : N× ({0, 1}∗)3 → {0, 1}
ζ(1k,Λ, x, w) =

0 if (x,w) ∈ R˙Λ,
1 if (x,w) ∈ R¨Λ,
undefined otherwise .
4) Hard Subset Membership. Intuitively speaking, it re-
quires that for any ~x ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ)), ~x can
be disordered without being detected. That is, for any
π ∈ Π, the two probability ensembles HSM1 def=
{HSM1(1k)}k∈N and HSM2 def= {HSM2(1k)}k∈N,
specified as follows, are computationally indistinguish-
able, i.e., HSM1
c
= HSM2.
HSM1(1
k): Λ ← PG(1k), ~a ← IS(1k,Λ), finally
outputs (Λ, ~x~a).
HSM2(1
k): Operates as same as HSM1(1
k) with an
exception that finally outputs (Λ, π(~x~a)).
5) Feasible Cheating. Intuitively speaking, it requires that
there is a way to cheat to generate a ~x which is supposed
to fall into Lh
R˙Λ
× Lt
R¨Λ
but actually falls into Ln
R˙Λ
without being caught. That is, for any π ∈ Π, for
any π′ ∈ Π, the two probability ensembles HSM2
and HSM3
def
= {HSM3(1k)}k∈N are computationally
indistinguishable, i.e., HSM2
c
= HSM3, where HSM2
is defined above and HSM3 is defined as follows.
HSM3(1
k):Λ ← PG(1k), ~a ← Cheat(1k), finally
outputs (Λ, π′(~x~a)).
Remark 5 (The Witnesses Of The Instances). The main
use of the witnesses of an instance x˙ ∈ LR˙Λ is to project
and gain the hash value of x. In contrast, with respect to an
instance x¨ ∈ LR¨Λ , it services as a proof of x¨ ∈ LR¨Λ . The
property distinguishability guarantees that given the needed
witness, the projective instances and the smooth instances are
distinguishable. For OT nh , this means that a receiver can use
the witnesses of x¨ to persuade a sender to believe that the
receiver is unable to gain the hash value of x¨.
Remark 6 (Hard Subset Membership). The property
hard subset membership guarantees that for any ~x ∈
Range(IS(1k,Λ)), any π ∈ Π, any PPT adversary A, the
advantage of A identifying an entry of π(~x) falling into LR˙Λ
(resp., LR¨Λ) with probability over prior knowledge h/n (resp.,
9t/n) is negligible. That is, seen from A, every entry of π(~x)
seems the same.
With respect to OT nh , this means that the receiver can
encode his private input into a permutation of a vector
~x ∈ LnRΛ without leaking any information. For example, if
the receiver expects to gain ~m〈H〉, then he may generates
a ~x and randomly chooses a permutation π ∈ Π such that
π(~x)〈i〉 ∈ LR˙Λ for each i ∈ H . Any PPT adversary knows
no new knowledge about H if only given π(~x).
However, if the witnesses of the instances of ~x are available
(the simulator can gain the witnesses by rewinding the adver-
sary), then the receiver’s input is known. Therefore, there is
way for the simulator to extract the real input of the adversary
controlling the corrupted receiver.
Remark 7 (Feasible Cheating). In our framework for OT nh ,
the sender uses the hash values of the instances generated by
the receiver to encrypt its private inputs. The property feasible
cheating makes cheating out of the sender’s all private inputs
feasible. Note that, this is a key for the simulator to extract the
real inputs of the adversary controlling the corrupted sender.
Therefore, it is conductive to construct a fully-simulatable
protocol for OT nh .
3.2 The Difference Between SPHDHCt,h And Re-
lated Hash Systems
Now we discuss the difference between our
SPHDHCt,h and related hash systems previous
works present or use. For simplicity, we only compare
our SPHDHCt,h with the hash system V SPHH which
is presented by [32]. We argue that this is justified,
on the one hand, the version of [32] is the version
holding most properties among previous works. On
the other hand, the aim of [32] is the closest to ours.
They aim to construct a framework for OT 21 which
actually is half-simulatable, while we aim to establish a
fully-simulatable framework for OT nh .
Loosely speaking, our SPHDHCt,h can be viewed
as a generalized version of V SPHH . Indeed, V SPHH
resembles SPHDHC1,1 very much and can be converted
into SPHDHC1,1 though some modification is needed.
The essential differences are listed as follows.
1) The key difference is that, besides each projective
instance x˙ holding a witness w˙, SPHDHCt,h also
requires each smooth instance x¨ to hold a witness
w¨.
2) To deal with OT nh , SPHDHCt,h extends the IS
algorithm to generate h x˙s and t x¨s in a invoca-
tion. As a natural result, SPHDHCt,h extends the
property smoothness to hold with respect to t x¨s,
and extends the property hard subset membership
to hold with respect to h x˙s and t x¨s.
3) In V SPHH there exists a instance test IT algo-
rithm that takes two instances as input and outputs
a bit indicating whether at least one of the two in-
stances is smooth, i.e., b← IT (x1, x2). SPHDHCt,h
discards this verifiability of smoothness and the
correlated IT , and instead provides a distinguisher
DI algorithm which is conducive to apply the
technique cut-and-choose.
4) SPHDHCt,h requires a additional property feasi-
ble cheating and the necessary algorithm Cheat.
This property provides a simulator with a way to
extract the real inputs of the adversary in the case
that the sender is corrupted.
5) SPHDHCt,h extends KG algorithm such that the
information of the instance is available to it. This
makes constructing hash system easier. In indeed,
this makes lattice-based hash system come true
which is thought difficult by [36].
We observe that the V SPHH indeed is easy to be
extended to deal with OT n1 , but seems difficult to be
extended to deal with the general OT nh . The reason is
that, to hold verifiable smoothness, x˙s and x¨s have to
be generated in a dependent way. This makes designing
IT dealing with n instances without leaking informa-
tion which is conductive to distinguish such x˙s and x¨s
difficult. Therefore, even constructing a framework for
OT nh that is half-simulatable as [32] seems impossible.
We also observe that, there is no way to construct a fully-
simulatable framework using V SPHH , because there is
no way to extract the real input of the adversary in the
case that the receiver is corrupted.
The difficulties mentioned above can be overcame by
requiring each x¨ to hold a witness too. Since the receiver
encodes his input as a permutation of x˙s and x¨s, a
simulator can the extract the real input of the adversary
in the case that the receiver is corrupted if their witnesses
are available. Combining the application of the technique
cut-and-choose, a simulator can see such witnesses by
rewinding the adversary. What is more, the implemen-
tation of DI is easier than that of its predecessor IT .
Because the operated object essentially is a pair of the
form (x,w) which is simpler than (x1, . . . , xn) which is
the general form of the objects operated by IT .
4 CONSTRUCTING A FRAMEWORK FOR
FULLY-SIMULATABLE OT nh
In this section, we construct a framework for OT nh . In
the framework, we will use a PPT algorithm, denoted Γ
, that receiving B1, B2 ∈ Ψ, outputs a uniformly chosen
permutation π ∈U Π such that π(B1) = B2, i.e., π ←
Γ(B1, B2). We give an example implementation of Γ as
follows.
Γ(B1, B2): First, E ← ∅, C ← [n]−B1. Second, for each
j ∈ B2, then i ∈U B1, B1 ← B1 − {i}, E ← E ∪ {j ⇋ i}.
Third, D ← [n] − B2, for each j ∈ D, then i ∈U C, C ←
C −{i}, E ← E ∪ {j ⇋ i}. Fourth, define π as π(i) = j if
and only if j ⇋ i ∈ E. Finally, outputs π.
4.1 The Framework For OT nh
• Common inputs: All entities know the public se-
curity parameter k, an positive polynomial polys(.),
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a SPHDHCt,h (where n = h + t) hash sys-
tem H, a information-theoretically hiding commit-
ment scheme (denoted by IHC), a information-
theoretically binding commitment scheme (denoted
by IBC).
• Private Inputs: Party P1 (i.e., the sender) holds a
private input ~m ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n and a randomness
r1 ∈ {0, 1}∗. Party P2 ( i.e., the receiver) holds a
private input H ∈ Ψ and a randomness r2 ∈ {0, 1}∗.
The adversary A holds a name list I ⊆ [2] and a
randomness rA ∈ {0, 1}∗.
• Auxiliary Inputs: The adversary A holds an infinite
auxiliary input sequence z = (zk)k∈N, zk ∈ {0, 1}∗.
The protocol works as follow. For clarity, we omit
some trivial error-handlings such as P1 refusing to send
P2 something which is supposed to be sent. Handling
such errors is easy. P2 halting and outputting abort1
suffices.
• Receiver’s step (R1): P2 generates hash parameters
and samples instances.
1) P2 samples polys(k) instance vectors. Let
K
def
= polys(k). P2 does: Λ ← PG(1k);
for each i ∈ [K], ~ai ← IS(1k,Λ). With-
out loss of generality, we assume ~ai =
((x˙1, w˙1), . . . , (x˙h, w˙h), (x¨h+1, w¨h+1), . . . ,
(x¨n, w¨n))
T .
2) P2 disorders each instance vector.
For each i ∈ [K], P2 uniformly chooses a
permutation π1i ∈U Π, then ~˜ai ← π1i (~ai).
3) P2 sends the instances and the corresponding
hash parameters, i.e., (Λ, ~˜x1, ~˜x2, . . . , ~˜xK), to P1,
where ~˜xi
def
= ~x~˜ai (correspondingly, ~˜wi
def
= ~w~˜ai ).
• Receiver’s step (R2-R3)/Sender’s step (S1-S2): P1
and P2 cooperate to toss coin to choose instance
vectors to open.
1) P1: s ∈U {0, 1}K , sends IHC(s) to P2.
2) P2: s
′ ∈U {0, 1}K , sends IBC(s′) to P1.
3) P1 and P2 respectively sends each other the de-
commitments to IHC(s) or IBC(s′), and re-
spectively checks the received de-commitments
are valid. If the check fails, P1 (P2 respectively)
halts and outputs abort2 (abort1 respectively).
If no check fails, then they proceed to next step.
4) P1 and P2 share a common randomness r =
s⊕s′. The instance vectors whose index fall into
CS
def
= {i|r〈i〉 = 1, i ∈ [K]} (correspondingly,
CS
def
= [K]− CS) are chosen to open.
• Receiver’s step (R4): P2 opens the chosen instances
to P1, encodes and sends his private input to P1.
1) P2 opens the chosen instances to prove that the
instances he generates are legal.
P2 sends ((i, j, ~˜wi〈j〉))i∈CS,j∈Ji to P1, where
Ji
def
= {j|~˜xi〈j〉 ∈ LR¨Λ , j ∈ [n]}.
2) P2 encodes his private input and sends the
resulting code to P1.
Let Gi
def
= {j|~˜xi〈j〉 ∈ LR˙Λ , i ∈ CS}. For each
i ∈ CS, P2 does π2i ← Γ(Gi, H), sends (π2i )i∈CS
to P1. That is, P2 encode his private input into
sequences such as π2i (~˜xi) where i ∈ CS.
Note that P2 can send ((i, j, ~˜wi〈j〉))i∈CS,j∈Ji and
(π2i )i∈CS in one step.
• Sender’s step (S3): P1 checks the chosen instances,
encrypts and sends his private input to P2.
1) P1 verifies that each chosen instance vectors is
legal, i.e., the number of the entries belonging
to LR˙Λ is not more than h.
P1 checks that, for each i ∈ CS, #Ji ≥ n − h,
and for each j ∈ Ji, V F (1k,Λ, ~˜xi〈j〉, ~˜wi〈j〉) is 1.
If the check fails, P1 halts and outputs abort2,
otherwise P1 proceeds to next step.
2) P1 reorders the entries of each unchosen in-
stance vector in the way told by P2.
For each i ∈ CS, P1 does ˜˜~xi ← π2i (~˜xi).
3) P1 encrypts and sends his private input to P2
together with some auxiliary messages.
For each i ∈ CS, j ∈ [n], P1 does: (hkij , pkij)←
KG(1k,Λ,
˜˜
~xi〈j〉), βij ← Hash(1k,Λ, ˜˜~xi〈j〉, hkij),
~βi
def
= (βi1, βi2, . . . , βin)
T ,~c ← ~m ⊕ (⊕i∈CS ~βi),−→
pki
def
= (pki1, pki2, . . . , pkin)
T , sends ~c and
(
−→
pki)i∈CS to P2.
• Receiver’s step (R5): P2 decrypts the ciphertext ~c
and gains the message he want.
For each i ∈ CS, j ∈ H , P2 operates: β′ij ←
pHash(1k,Λ,
˜˜
~xi〈j〉,−→pki〈j〉, ˜˜~wi〈j〉), m′j ← ~c〈j〉 ⊕
(⊕i∈CSβ′ij). Finally, P2 gains the messages (m′j)j∈H .
4.2 The Correctness Of The Framework
Now let us check the correctness of the framework, i.e.,
the framework works in the case that P1 and P2 are
honest. For each i ∈ CS, j ∈ H , we know
~c〈j〉 = ~m〈j〉 ⊕ (⊕i∈CS ~βi〈j〉)
m′j = ~c〈j〉 ⊕ (⊕i∈CSβ′ij)
Because of the projection of H, we know
~βi〈j〉 = β′ij
So we have
~m〈j〉 = m′j
This means what P2 gets is ~m〈H〉 that indeed is P2
wants.
4.3 The Security Of The Framework
With respect to the security of the framework, we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 8 (The protocol is secure against the malicious
adversaries). Assume that H is an t-smooth h-projective
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hash family that holds properties distinguishability, hard sub-
set membership and feasible cheating, IHC is a information-
theoretically hiding commitment, IBC is a information-
theoretically binding commitment. Then, the protocol securely
computes the oblivious transfer functionality in the presence
of non-adaptive malicious adversaries.
We defer the strick proof of Theorem 8 to section 5 and
first give an intuitive analysis here as a warm-up. For the
security of P1, the framework should prevent P2 from
gaining more than h messages. Using cut and choose
technique, P1 makes sure with some probability that
each instance vector contains no more than h projective
instance, which leads to P2 learning extra messages is
difficult. The following theorem guarantees that this
probability is overwhelming.
Theorem 9. Assume that the commitment schemes employed
in the framework are a perfectly hiding commitment and a
perfectly binding commitment. Then, in case that P1 is honest
and P2 is corrupted, the probability that P2 cheats to obtain
more than h messages is at most 1/2polys(k).
Proof: According to the framework, there are two
necessary conditions for P2’s success in the cheating.
1) P2 has to generate at least one illegal ~xi which
contains more than h entries belonging to LR˙Λ . If
not, P2 cann’t correctly decrypt more than h entries
of ~c, because of the smoothness of H. Without loss
of generality, we assume the illegal instance vectors
are ~xl1 , ~xl2 , . . . , ~xld .
2) All illegal instance vectors are lucky not to be
chosen and all the instance vectors unchosen
just are the illegal instance vectors, i.e., CS =
{l1, l2, . . . , ld}. We prove this claim in two case.
a) In the case that CS 6= {l1, l2, . . . , ld} and CS−
{l1, l2, . . . , ld} = ∅, there exists j(j ∈ [d] ∧ lj ∈
CS). So P1 can detect P2’s cheating and P2
will gain nothing.
b) In the case that CS 6= {l1, l2, . . . , ld} and
CS − {l1, l2, . . . , ld} 6= ∅, there exists j(j ∈
CS ∧ ~xj is legal). Because of the smoothness
of H, P2 cannot correctly decrypt more than h
entries of ~c.
Now, let us estimate the probability that the second
necessary condition is met. Note that, IHC(s) is a per-
fectly hiding commitment, IBC(s′) is a perfectly binding
commitment, and P1 is honest, so the shared randomness
r is uniformly distributed. We have
Pr(CS = {l1, l2, . . . , ld}) = (1/2)d(1/2)polys(k)−d
= 1/2polys(k)
This means that the probability that P2 cheats to obtain
more than h messages is at most 1/2polys(k).
From the proof of Theorem 9, it is easy to see that if
the commitment schemes employed are the ones with
statically properties, the probability that P2 cheats to
obtain more than h messages is negligible too, since the
upper-bound of this probability deviates 1/2polys(k) at
most negligible distance.
For the security of P2, the framework first should
prevent P1 from learning P2’s private input. There is
a potential risk in Step R4 where P2 encodes his pri-
vate input. From Remark 6, we know that hard subset
membership guarantees that for any PPT malicious P1,
without being given π1i , the probability that P1 learns
any new knowledge is negligible. Thus P2’s encod-
ing is safe. Besides cheating P2 of private input, it
seems there is another obvious attack that malicious P1
sends invalid messages, e.g. pkij which (hkij , pkij) /∈
Range(KG(1k,Λ, xij)), to P2. This attack in fact doesn’t
matter. Its effect is equal to that of P1’s altering his real
input, which is allowed in the ideal world too.
4.4 The Communication Rounds
Step R1 and Step R2 can be taken in one round. Step R5
is taken without communication. Each of other steps is
taken in one round. Therefore, the total number of the
communication rounds is six.
Compared with existing fully-simulatable protocols
for oblivious transfer that without resorting to a random
oracle or a trusted common reference string (CRS), our
protocol is the most efficient one. On counting the total
communication rounds of a protocol, we count that
of the modified version. In the modified version, the
consecutive communications of the same direction are
combined into one round. The protocol for OT nh×1 of
[6] costs one, two zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge
respectively in initialization and in transfer a message,
where each zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge is per-
formed in four rounds. The whole protocol costs at least
ten rounds. The protocol for OT nh of [28] costs one zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge in initialization which
is performed in three rounds at least, one protocol to
extract a secret key corresponding to the identity of a
message which is performed in four rounds, one zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge in transfer a message
which is performed in three rounds at least. We point out
that the interactive proof of knowledge of a discrete log-
arithm modulo a prime, presented by [51] and taken as a
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol in [28], to
our best knowledge, is not known to be zero-knowledge.
However, turning to the techniques of Σ-protocol, [14]
make it zero-knowledge at cost of increment of three
rounds in communication, which in turn induces the
increment in communication rounds of the protocol of
[28]. Taking all into consideration, this protocol costs at
least ten rounds. The protocol for OT 21 of [36] costs six
rounds.
4.5 The Computational Overhead
We measure the computational overhead of the frame-
work in terms of the number of public key operations
(i.e., operations based on trapdoor functions, or similar
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operations) , because the overhead of public key op-
erations, which depends on the length of their inputs,
is greater than that of symmetric key operations (i.e.,
operations based on one-way functions) by orders of
magnitude. Please see [38] to know which cryptographic
operation is public key operation or private key opera-
tion.
As to the framework, the public key operations are
Hash(.) and pHash(.), and the symmetric key operations
are IHC(.) and IBC(.). In Step S3, P1 takes n · #CS
invocations of Hash(.) to encrypt his private input. In
Step R5, P2 takes h · #CS invocations of pHash(.) to
decrypt the messages he want. The value of #CS is
polys(k), polys(k)/2, respectively, in the worst case and
in the average case. Thus, fixing the problem we tackle
(i.e., fixing the values of n and h), the efficiency only
depends on the value of polys(k). In Section 5 where we
strictly prove the security of the framework, we’ll see
that in the case that only P2 is corrupted, our simulator
doesn’t consider a situation in the real world that arises
with probability at most 1/2polys(k). Therefore, setting
polys(k) = 40 is secure enough to use our framework in
practice. In the worst case the computational overhead
mainly consists of 40n invocations of Hash() taken by
P1 and 40h invocations of pHash() taken by P2; in
the average case the computational overhead mainly
consists of 20n invocations of Hash() taken by P1 and
20h invocations of pHash() taken by P2.
We point out that, our simulator also may fail (with
negligible probability) in the case that P1 is corrupted,
but the probability of this event arising depends on the
computational hiding of IBC and on the computational
binding of IHC rather than the value of polys(k) and has
no influence on computational overhead. So we don’t
need to take this case into consideration here.
Compared with existing fully-simulatable protocols
for oblivious transfer that without resorting to a random
oracle or a trusted CRS, our DDH-based instantiation
that will be presented in Section 7.1 is the most efficient
one in computational overhead. The operations of the
protocol in [6] are based on the non-standard assump-
tions, i.e., q-Power Decisional Diffie-Hellman and q-
Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) assumptions, which both
are associated with bilinear groups. [13] indicates that q-
SDH-based operations are more expensive that standard-
assumption-based operations. The operations of the pro-
tocol in [28] are based on Decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (DBDH) assumption. Since bilinear curves are
considerably more expensive than regular Elliptic curves
[19] and DDH is obtainable from Elliptic curves, the
operations in [6], [28] are considerably more expensive
than that DDH-based operations. Therefore, our DDH-
based instantiation are more efficient than the protocols
presented by [6], [28]. The DDH-based protocol for OT 21
presented by [36] also are very efficient. However, it can
be viewed as a specific case of our framework, thought
some modification of the protocol is needed.
We have to admit that, in the context of a trusted CRS
is available and only OT 21 is needed, [48]’s DDH-based
instantiation, which is two-round efficient and of two
public key encryption operations and one public key
decryption operation, is the most efficient one, no matter
seen from the number of communication rounds or the
computational overhead.
5 A SECURITY PROOF OF THE FRAMEWORK
We prove Theorem 8 holds in this section. For nota-
tional clarity, we denote the entities, the parties and the
adversary in the real world by P1, P2, A, and denote
the corresponding entities in the ideal world by P ′1, P
′
2,
A′. In the light of the parties being corrupted, there are
four cases to be considered and we prove Theorem 8
holds in each case. For simplicity, we assume that the
commitment schemes employed are a perfectly binding
commitment scheme and a perfectly hiding commitment
scheme. If the statically ones are employed, the proof can
be done in the same way with a slight modification.
We don’t know how to construct a strictly polynomial-
time simulator for the adversary in the real world, in the
case that only P1 or P2 is corrupted. Instead, expected
polynomial-time simulators are constructed (see section
2.2 for the justification), which results in a failure of
standard black-box reduction technique. Fortunately, the
problem and its derived problems can be solved using
the technique given by [26].
5.1 In the case that P1 Is Corrupted
In the case that P1 is corrupted, A takes the full control
of P1 in the real world. Correspondingly, A’s simulator,
A′, takes the full control of P ′1 in the ideal world, where
A′ is constructed as follow.
• Initial input: A′ holds the same k, I
def
= {1}, z =
(zk)k∈N, as A. What is more, A′ holds a uniform
distributed randomness rA′ ∈ {0, 1}∗. The parties P ′1
and P1, whom A
′ and A respectively is to corrupt,
hold the same ~m.
• A′ works as follows.
– Step Sm1: A′ corrupts P ′1 and learns P
′
1’s private
input ~m. Let A¯ be a copy of A, i.e., A¯ = A. A′
use A¯ as a subroutine. A′ fixes the initial inputs
of A¯ to be identical to his except that fixes the
randomness of A¯ to be a uniformly distributed
value. A′ activates A¯, and supplies A¯ with ~m
before A¯ engages in the protocol for OT nh .
In the following steps, A′ builds an environment
for A¯ which simulates the real world. That is, A′
disguises himself as P1 and P2 at the same time
to interact with A¯.
– Step Sm2: A′ uniformly chooses a randomness
r ∈U {0, 1}K (K def= polys(k)) as the shared
randomness. Let CS and CS be the sets decided
by r. For each i ∈ CS, A′ honestly generates
the hash parameters and instance vectors. For
each i ∈ CS, A′ calls Cheat(1k) to generate such
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parameters and vectors. A′ sends these hash
parameters and instance vectors to A¯.
Remark 10. From the remark 6, we know that each
entry of the instance vector generated by Cheat(1k)
is projective. If such instance vectors are not chosen
to be open, then the probability of A¯ detecting this
fact is negligible, and A′ can extract the real input
of A¯, which is we want.
– Step Sm3: A′ plays the role of P2 and executes
Step R2-R3 of the framework to cooperate with
A¯ to toss coin. When tossing coin is completed
successfully, A′ learns and records the value s
A¯ commits to.
Remark 11. The aim of doing this tossing coin is
to know the randomness s A¯ choses. What A′ will
do next is to take IBC(r⊕ s) as his commitment to
redo tossing coin.
– Step Sm4: A′ repeats the following proce-
dure, denoted Υ, until A¯ correctly reveals the
recorded value s.
Υ: A′ rewinds A¯ to the end of Step S1 of the
framework. Then, taking IBCγ(r ⊕ s) as his
commitment, A′ executes Step R2 and R3 of
the framework, where γ is a fresh randomness
uniformly chosen.
– Step Sm5: Now A′ and A¯ shares the common
randomness r. A′ executes Step R4 of the frame-
work as the honest P2 do. On receiving ~c and
(
−→
pki)i∈CS , A
′ correctly decrypts all entries of ~c
and gains A¯’s full real private input ~m. Then A′
sends ~m to the TTP .
– Step Sim6: When A¯ halts, A′ halts with out-
putting what A¯ outputs.
Without considering Step Sim4, A′ is polynomial-time.
However, taking Step Sim4 into consideration, this is
not true any more. Let q(α), p(α) respectively denotes
the probability that A¯ correctly reveals his commit-
ment in Step Sim3 and in Procedure Υ, where α
def
=
(1k, zk, I, ~m, rA¯). Then, the expected times of repeating
Υ in Step Sim4 is q(α)/p(α). Since the view A¯ holds
before revealing his commitment in Step Sim3 is different
from that in procedure Υ, q(α), p(α) are distinct. What
the computational secrecy of IBC guarantees and only
guarantees is |q(α) − p(α)| = µ(.). However, there is a
risk that q(α)/p(α) is not bound by a polynomial. For
example, q(α) = 1/2k, p(α) = 1/22k, which result in
q(α)/p(α) = 2k. This is a big problem and gives rise
to many other difficulties we will encounter later.
Fortunately, [26] encounters and solves the same prob-
lem and its derived problem as ours. In a little more
details, [26] presents a protocol, in which P1, P2 re-
spectively sends a perfectly hiding commitment, a per-
fectly binding commitment, and the corresponding de-
commitments to each other as the situation of tossing
coin of our framework. To prove the security in the case
that P1 is corrupted, [26] constructs a simulator in the
same way as ours and encounters the same problem as
ours.
Using the idea of [26], we can overcome such problem
too. Specifically, an expected polynomial-time simula-
tor can be obtained by replacing Step Sim4 with Step
Sim4.1, Sim4.2 given as follow.
• Step Sim4.1: A′ estimates the value of q(α). A′
repeats the following procedure, denoted Φ, until
the number of the time of A¯ correctly revealing his
commitment is up to poly(k), where poly(.) is a big
enough polynomial.
Φ: A′ rewinds A¯ to the end of Step S1 of the
framework and A′ honestly executes Step R2 and
R3 of the framework to interact with it.
Denote the number of times that Φ is repeated by
d, then q(α) is estimated as q˜(α)
def
= poly(k)/d.
• Step Sim4.2: A′ repeats the procedure Υ. In case A¯
correctly reveals the recorded value s, A′ proceeds
to the next step. In case A¯ correctly reveals a value
which is different from s, A′ outputs ambiguity1 and
halts. In case the number of the time of repeating
Υ exceeds the value of poly(k)/q˜(α), A′ outputs
timeout and halts.
Proposition 12. The simulator A′ is expected polynomial-
time.
Proof: Conditioning on Step Sim4.1 is executed, the
expected value of d is poly(k)/q(α). Choosing a big
enough poly(.), q˜(α) is within a constant factor of q(α)
with probability 1 − 2poly(k). Therefore, the expected
running time of A′,
ExpT imeA′ ≤ T imeSim1 + T imeSim2 + T imeSim3
+ q(α) · (T imeΦ · poly(k)/q(α)+
T imeΥ · poly(k)/q˜(α))
+ T imeSim5 + T imeSim6
, is bounded by a polynomial.
What is more, we have
1) The probability that A′ outputs timeout is negligi-
ble.
2) The probability that A′ outputs ambiguity1 is neg-
ligible.
3) The output of A′ in the ideal world and the output
of A in the real world are computationally indis-
tinguishable, i.e.,
{Idealf,{1},A′(zk)(1k, ~m,H)〈1〉}k∈N, ~m∈({0,1}∗)n
H∈Ψ,zk∈{0,1}∗
c
=
{Realπ,{1},A(zk)(1k, ~m,H)〈1〉}k∈N, ~m∈({0,1}∗)n
H∈Ψ,zk∈{0,1}∗
(2)
Since the propositions above can be proven in the
same way as [26], we don’t iterate such details here.
Proposition 13. In the case that P1 was corrupted, i.e., I =
{1}, the equation (1) required by Definition 1 holds.
Proof: First let us focus on the real world. A’s real
input can be formulated as γ ← A(1k, ~m, zk, rA, r1). Note
that in this case, P2’s output is a determinate function of
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A’s real input. Since A’s real input is in its view, with-
out loss of generality, we assume A’s output, denoted
α, constains its real input. Therefore, P2’s output is a
determinate function of A’s output, where the function
is
g(α) =
{
abort1 if γ = abort1,
γ〈H〉 otherwise.
Let h(α)
def
= (α, λ, g(α)). Then we have
Realπ,{1},A(zk)(1
k, ~m,H) ≡
h(Realπ,{1},A(zk)(1
k, ~m,H)〈0〉)
Similarly, in the ideal world, we have
Idealf,{1},A′(zk)(1
k, ~m,H)
c
=
h(Idealf,{1},A′(zk)(1
k, ~m,H)〈0〉)
We use
c
= not ≡ here because there is a negligible
probability that A′ outputs timeout or ambiguity1, which
makes h(.) undefined.
Let X(1k, ~m,H, zk, {1}) def=
Realπ,{1},A(zk)(1
k, ~m,H)〈0〉, Y (1k, ~m,H, zk, {1}) def=
Idealf,{1},A′(zk)(1
k, ~m,H)〈0〉. Following equation (2),
X
c
= Y . Let F
def
= (h)k∈N. What is more, assume
that A′ runs in a strictly polynomial-time. According
to Proposition 20 we will present in Section 7, the
proposition holds.
In fact, A′ doesn’t run in strictly polynomial-time,
which results in a failure of above standard reduction.
Fortunately, this difficulty can be overcome by truncating
the rare executions of A′ which are too long, then
applying standard reduction techniques. Since the details
is the same as [26], we don’t give them here and please
see [26] for them.
5.2 In the case that P2 Is Corrupted
In the case that P2 is corrupted, A takes the full control
of P2 in the real world. Correspondingly, A
′ takes the
full control of P ′2 in the ideal world. We construct A
′ as
follows.
• Initial input: A′ holds the same k, I
def
= {2}, z =
(zk)k∈N as A, and holds a uniformly distributed
randomness rA′ ∈ {0, 1}∗. The parties P ′2 and P2
hold the same private input H .
• A′ works as follows.
– Step Sim1: A′ corrupts P ′2 and learns P
′
2’s pri-
vate input H . A′ takes A’s copy A¯ as a subrou-
tine, fixes A¯’s initial input, activates A¯, supplies
A¯ with H , builds an environment for A¯ in the
same way as A′ does in the case that P1 is
corrupted.
– Step Sim2: Playing the role of P1, A
′ honestly ex-
ecutes the sender’s steps until reaches Step S3.3.
If Step S3.3 is reached, A′ records the shared
randomness r and the messages, denoted msg,
which he sends to A¯. Then A′ proceeds to next
step. Otherwise, A′ sends abort2 to TTP, outputs
what A¯ outputs and halts.
– Step Sim3: A′ repeats the following procedure,
denoted Ξ, until the hash parameters and the
instance vectors A¯ sends in Step R1 passes the
check. A′ records the shared randomness r˜, the
messages A¯ sends to open the chosen instance
vectors.
Ξ: A′ rewinds A¯ to the beginning of Step R2, and
honestly follows sender’s steps until reaches
Step S3.3 to interact with A¯.
Note that, in each repeating Ξ, the value A′ com-
mits to and the randomness used to generate the
commitment in Step S1 are fresh and uniformly
chosen.
– Step Sim4:
1) In case r = r˜, A′ outputs failure and halts;
2) In case r 6= r˜ ∧ ∀i(r〈i〉 6= r˜〈i〉 → r〈i〉 = 1 ∧
r˜〈i〉 = 0), A′ runs from scratch;
3) Otherwise, i.e., in case r 6= r˜ ∧ ∃i(r〈i〉 = 0 ∧
r˜〈i〉 = 1), A′ records the first one, denoted e,
of these is and proceeds to next step.
Remark 14. The aim of Step Sim3 and Sim4 is to
prepare to extract the real input of A¯. If the third
case happens, then A′ knows each entry of ~˜xe he
sees in Step Sim2 belong to LR˙Λe or LR¨Λe . What
is more, ~˜xe is indeed a legal instance vector. This is
because ~˜xe passes the check executed by A
′ in Step
Sim3. Combing π2e received in Step Sim2, A
′ knows
the real input of A¯.
Note that, A¯’s initial input is fixed by A′ in Step
Sim1. So receiving the same messages, A¯ responds
in the same way. Therefore, rewinding A¯ to the
beginning of Step R2, sending the message sent in
Step Sim2, A′ can reproduce the same scenario as he
meets in Step Sim2.
– Step Sim5: A′ rewinds A¯ to the beginning of
Step R2 of the framework, and sends msg pre-
viously recorded to A¯ in order. According to the
analysis of Remark 14, A′ can extract A¯’s real
input H ′. A′ does so and sends H ′ to TTP and
receives message ~m〈H ′〉.
– Step Sim6: A′ constructs ~m′ as follows. For each
i ∈ H ′, ~m′〈i〉 ← ~m〈i〉. For each i /∈ H ′, ~m′〈i〉 ∈U
{0, 1}∗. Playing the role of P1 and taking ~m′ as
his real input, A′ follows Step S3.3 to complete
the interaction with A¯.
– Step Sim6: When A¯ halts, A′ halts with out-
putting what A¯ outputs..
Note that S doesn’t simulate a situation in the real
world that A cheats P1 of more than h message. For-
tunately, Theorem 9 guarantees that this situation arises
with probability at most 1/2polys(k) and so can be ig-
nored.
Proposition 15. The simulator A′ is expected polynomial-
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time.
Proof: First, let us focus on Step Sim3. In each
repetition of Ξ, because of the perfectly hiding of IHC(.),
and the uniform distribution of the value A′ commits to,
the chosen instance vectors are uniformly distributed.
This lead to the probability that A¯ passes the check in
each repetition is the same. Denote this probability by p.
The expected time of Step Sim3 is
ExpT imeSim3 = (1/p) · T imeΞ
Under the same analysis, the probability that A¯ passes
the check in Step Sim2 is p too. Then, the expected time
that A′ runs once from Step Sim1 to the beginning of
Step Sim4 is
OncExpT imeSim1→Sim4 ≤ T imeSim1 + T imeSim2
+ p ·ExpT imeSim3
= T imeSim1 + T imeSim2
+ T imeΞ
Second, let us focus on Step Sim4, especially the case
that A′ needs to run from scratch. Note that the initial
inputs A′ holds is the same in each trial. Thus the
probability that A′ runs from scratch in each trial is
the same. We denote this probability by 1 − q. Then
the expected time that A′ runs from Step Sim1 to the
beginning of Step Sim5 is
ExpT imeSim1→Sim5 ≤ (1 + 1/q)
· (OncExpT imeSim1→Sim4
+ T imeSim4)
= (1 + 1/q) · (T imeSim1+
T imeSim2 + T imeΞ + T imeSim4)
The reason there is 1 here is that A′ has to run from
scratch at least one time in any case.
The expected running time of A′ in a whole execution
is
ExpT imeA′ ≤ ExpT imeSim1→Sim5 + T imeSim5
+ T imeSim6
= (1 + 1/q) · (T imeSim1 + T imeSim2
+ T imeΞ + T imeSim4)
+ T imeSim5 + T imeSim6
(3)
Third, let us estimate the value of q, which is the
probability that A′ does not run from scratch in a trial.
We denote this event by C. It’s easy to see that event
C happens, if and only if one of the following events
happens.
1) Event B happens, where B denotes the even that
A′ halts before reaching Step Sim3.
2) Event B¯ happens and R = R˜, where R and R˜
respectively denotes the random variable which is
defined as the shared randomness A′ gets in Step
Sim2 and Step Sim3.
3) Event B¯ happens and there exists i such that R〈i〉 =
0 ∧ R˜〈i〉 = 1 .
So
q =Pr(C)
=Pr(B) + Pr(B¯ ∩R = R˜)
+ Pr(B¯ ∩ ∃i(R〈i〉 = 0 ∧ R˜〈i〉 = 1))
=Pr(B) + Pr(B¯) · (Pr(R = R˜|B¯)
+ Pr(∃i(R〈i〉 = 0 ∧ R˜〈i〉 = 1)|B¯))
(4)
Let S1
def
= {(r, r˜)|(r, r˜) ∈ ({0, 1}K)2, r = r˜}, S2 def=
{(r, r˜)|(r, r˜) ∈ ({0, 1}K)2, r 6= r˜, ∀i(r〈i〉 6= r˜〈i〉 → r〈i〉 =
1 ∧ r˜〈i〉 = 0)}, S3 def= {(r, r˜)|(r, r˜) ∈ ({0, 1}K)2, r 6=
r˜, ∃i(i ∈ [K] ∧ r〈i〉 = 0 ∧ r˜〈i〉 = 1)}. It is easy to see that
S1, S2, S3 constitute a complete partition of ({0, 1}K)2
and #S1 = 2
K , #S2 = #S3 = (2
K · 2K − 2K)/2.
Because of the perfectly hiding of IHC(.), and the
uniform distribution of the value A′ commits to, R and
R˜ are all uniformly distributed. We have
Pr(R = R˜|B¯) = #S1/#({0, 1}K)2 = 1/2K (5)
and
Pr(∃i(R〈i〉 = 0 ∧ R˜〈i〉 = 1)|B¯) = #S3/#({0, 1}K)2
= 1/2− 1/2K+1 (6)
Combining equation (4), (5) and (6), we have
q = Pr(B) + Pr(B¯)(1/2 + 1/2K+1)
= 1/2 + 1/2K+1 + (1/2− 1/2K+1)Pr(B)
> 1/2
(7)
Combining equation (3) and (7), we have
ExpT imeA′ < 3(T imeSim1 + T imeSim2
+ T imeΞ + T imeSim4)
+ T imeSim5 + T imeSim6
which means the expected running time of A′ is bound
by a polynomial.
Lemma 16. The probability that A′ outputs failure is less
than 1/2K−1.
Proof: Let X be a random variable defined as the
number of the trials in a whole execution. From the proof
of Proposition 15, we know two facts. First, Pr(X = i) =
(1 − q)i−1q < 1/2i−1. Second, in each trial the event A′
outputs failure is the combined event of B¯ and R = R˜,
where the combined event happens with the following
probability.
Pr(B¯ ∩R = R˜) = Pr(B¯)Pr(R = R˜|B¯) ≤ Pr(R = R˜|B¯)
Combining equation (5), this probability is not more than
1/2K . Therefore, the probability that A′ outputs failure
in a whole execution is
∞∑
i=1
Pr(X = i)Pr(B¯ ∩R = R˜) < (1/2K) ·
∞∑
i=1
1/2i−1
= 1/2K−1
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Lemma 17. The output of the adversary A in the real
world and that of the simulator A′ in the ideal world are
computationally indistinguishable, i.e.,
{Realπ,{2},A(zk)(1k, ~m,H)〈0〉}k∈N, ~m∈({0,1}∗)n
H∈Ψ,zk∈{0,1}∗
c
=
{Idealf,{2},A′(zk)(1k, ~m,H)〈0〉}k∈N, ~m∈({0,1}∗)n
H∈Ψ,zk∈{0,1}∗
Proof: First, we claim that the outputs of A′ and A¯
are computationally indistinguishable. The only point
that the output of A′ is different from that of A¯ is A′
may outputs failure. Since the probability that this point
arises is negligible, our claim holds.
Second, we claim that the outputs of A and A¯ are
computationally indistinguishable. The only point that
the view of A¯ is different from that of A is that the
ciphertext A¯ receives is generated by encrypting ~m′
not ~m. Fortunately, SPHDHCt,h’s property smoothness
guarantees that the ciphertext generated in the two
way are computationally indistinguishable. Therefore,
our claim holds.
Combining the two claims, the proposition holds.
Proposition 18. In the case that P2 was corrupted, i.e., I =
{2}, the equation (1) required by Definition 1 holds.
Proof: Note that the honest parties P1 and P
′
1 end
up with outputting nothing. Thus, the fact that the out-
puts of A′ and A are computationally indistinguishable,
which is supported by Lemma 17, directly prove this
proposition holds.
5.3 Other Cases
In the case that both P1 and P2 are corrupted, A takes
the full control of the two corrupted parties. In the ideal
world, a similar situation also holds with respect to A′,
P ′1 and P
′
2. Liking in previous cases, A
′ uses A’s copy,
A¯, as a subroutine and builds a simulated environment
for A¯. A′ provids A¯ with P ′1 and P
′
2’s initial inputs
before A¯ engages in the protocol. When A¯ halts, A′ halts
with outputting what A¯ outputs. Obviously, A′ runs in
strictly polynomial-time and the equation (1) required
by Definition 1 holds in this case.
In the case that none of P1 and P2 is corrupted. The
simulator A′ is constructed as follows. A′ uses A¯, P¯1,
P¯2 as subroutines, where A¯, P¯1, P¯2, respectively, is the
copy of A, P1 and P2. A
′ fixes A¯’s initial inputs in the
same way as in previous cases. A′ chooses an arbitrary
~¯m ∈ ({0, 1}∗)n and a uniformly distributed random-
ness r¯1 as P¯1’s initial inputs. A
′ chooses an arbitrary
H¯ ∈ Ψ and a uniformly distributed randomness r¯2
as P¯2’s initial inputs. A
′ actives these subroutines and
make the communication between P¯1 and P¯2 available
to A¯. Note that, in the case that none of P1 and P2 is
corrupted, what adversaries can see in real life only is the
communication between honest parties. When A¯ halts,
A′ halts with outputting what A¯ outputs. Obviously, A′
runs in strictly polynomial-time and the equation (1)
required by Definition 1 holds in this case.
6 HOW TO CONSTRUCT SPHDHCt,h EASILY
SPHDHCt,h holds so many properties that constructing
it from scratch is not always easy. In this section, we
reduce constructing SPHDHCt,h to constructing seem-
ingly simpler hash systems. A idea naturally arising is
that generating the instances independently in essence
to obtain the required properties. We keep this idea in
mind to proceed to construct SPHDHCt,h.
6.1 Smoothness
In this section, we describe how to obtain smoothness for
a hash family. First, we introduce a lemma from [24].
Lemma 19 ( [24]). Let X
def
= {X(1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗
and Y
def
= {Y (1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ be two polynomial-time
constructible probability ensembles, and X
c
= Y , then
~X
c
= ~Y
where ~X
def
= { ~X(1k, a)} k∈N
a∈{0,1}∗
, ~X(1k, a)
def
=
(Xi(1
k, a))i∈[poly(k)], each Xi(1k, a) = X(1k, a),
~Y
def
= {~Y (1k, a)} k∈N
a∈{0,1}∗
, ~Y (1k, a)
def
= (Yi(1
k, a))i∈[poly(k)],
each Yi(1
k, a) = Y (1k, a), and all Xi(1
k, a), Yi(1
k, a) are
independent.
Proposition 20. Let X
def
= {X(1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ and
Y
def
= {Y (1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ be two polynomial-time con-
structible probability ensembles, X
c
= Y , F
def
= (fk)k∈N,
fk : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is polynomial-time computable, then
F (X)
c
= F (Y )
where F (X)
def
= {fk(X(1k, a))}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ ,F (Y ) def=
{fk(Y (1k, a))}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ .
Proof: Assume the proposition is false, then there ex-
ists a non-uniform PPT distinguisher D with an infinite
sequence z = (zk)k∈N, a polynomial poly(.), an infinite
positive integer set G ⊆ N such that, for each k ∈ G, it
holds that
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a, fk(X(1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a, fk(Y (1
k, a))) = 1)| ≥ 1/poly(k)
We construct a distinguisher D′ with an infinite se-
quence z = (zk)k∈N for the ensembles X and Y as
follows.
D′(1k, zk, a, γ): δ ← fk(γ), finally outputs
D(1k, zk, a, δ).
Obviously, D′(1k, zk, a,X(1k, a)) =
D(1k, zk, a, fk(X(1
k, a)), D′(1k, zk, a, Y (1k, a)) =
D(1k, zk, a, fk(Y (1
k, a)). So we have
|Pr(D′(1k, zk, a,X(1k, a)) = 1)−
Pr(D′(1k, zk, a, Y (1k, a)) = 1)| ≥ 1/poly(k)
This contradicts the fact X
c
= Y .
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Lemma 21. LetH = (PG, IS,DI,KG,Hash, pHash,Cheat)
be a Hash Family. n
def
= h + t. For each i ∈ [2]
and j ∈ [n], Smji
def
= {Smji (1k)}k∈N
def
=
{(SmGeni(1k)〈1〉, SmGeni(1k)〈2〉〈j〉)}k∈N, where
SmGeni(1
k) is defined in Definition 4. If H meets the
following three conditions
1) All random variables SmGeni(1
k)〈2〉〈j〉 are indepen-
dent, where i ∈ [2],j ∈ [n]− [h].
2) Smh+11 = . . . = Sm
n
1 , and Sm
h+1
2 = . . . = Sm
n
2 .
3) Smh+11
c
= Smh+12 .
then H has property smoothness.
Proof: Following Lemma 19,
{(Smh+11 (1k), . . . , Smn1 (1k))}k∈N
c
= {(Smh+12 (1k), . . . , Smn2 (1k))}k∈N
holds. Let ~X
def
= {(Sm11(1k), . . . , Smn1 (1k))}k∈N, and
~Y
def
= {(Sm12(1k), . . . , Smn2 (1k))}k∈N. From the defini-
tion of SmGeni(1
k), we notice that, for each j ∈ [h]
Smj1(1
k) = Smj2(1
k). So it holds that
~X
c
= ~Y
Since each Smji (1
k) is polynomial-time constructible,
thus both ~X and ~Y are polynomial-time constructible. Let
F
def
= (π)k∈N, where π ∈ Π. Following Proposition 20, we
have F ( ~X)
c
= F (~Y ), i.e.,
{π(Sm11(1k), . . . , Smn1 (1k))}k∈N
c
= {π(Sm12(1k), . . . , Smn2 (1k))}k∈N
Notice that SmGen1(1
k)〈1〉 = SmGen2(1k)〈1〉, we
have
{(SmGen1(1k)〈1〉, π(SmGen1(1k)〈2〉))}k∈N
c
= {(SmGen2(1k)〈1〉, π(SmGen2(1k)〈2〉))}k∈N
That is
Sm1
c
= Sm2
, which meets the requirement of the smoothness.
Loosely speaking, following Lemma 21, given a hash
family H, if each x¨ was sampled in an independent way
and its projective key is useless to obtain the value of
Hash(1k,Λ, x¨, .), then H is smooth.
6.2 Hard Subset Membership
In this section, we deal with how to obtain hard subset
membership for a hash family.
Proposition 22. Let X
def
= {X(1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ and
Y
def
= {Y (1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ be two polynomial-time con-
structible probability ensembles, and X
c
= Y . Then
−−→
XY
c
= Φ(
−−→˜
XY )
where
−−→
XY and Φ(
−−→˜
XY ) are two probability ensembles defined
as follows.
•
−−→
XY
def
= {−−→XY (1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ , −−→XY (1k, a) def=
(X1(1
k, a), . . . , Xpoly1(k)(1
k, a), Ypoly1(k)+1(1
k, a), . . . ,
Ypoly(k)(1
k, a)), each Xi(1
k, a) = X(1k, a), each
Yi(1
k, a) = Y (1k, a), poly1(.) ≤ poly(.), all Xi(1k, a)
and Yi(1
k, a) are independent;
• Φ(
−−→˜
XY )
def
= {Φk(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ ,−−→˜
XY (1k, a) =
−−→
XY (1k, a), Φ
def
= (Φk)k∈N, each
Φk is a permutation over [poly(k)].
Proof: In case Φk([poly1(k)]) ⊆ [poly1(k)], it ob-
viously holds. We proceed to prove it also holds in
case Φk([poly1(k)]) * [poly1(k)]. Assume it does not
hold in this case, then there exists a non-uniform PPT
distinguisher D with an infinite sequence z = (zk)k∈N, a
polynomial poly2(.), a infinite positive integer set G ⊆ N
such that, for each k ∈ G,
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,−−→XY (1k, a)) = 1)
− Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φk(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)) = 1)|
≥ 1/poly2(k) (8)
V
def
= {i|i ∈ [poly1(k)],Φk(i) ∈ [poly(k)]− [poly1(k)]}. We
list the elements of V in order as i1 < ... < ij ... < i#V .
Let Vj
def
= {i1, . . . , ij}. We define the following permuta-
tions over [poly(k)].
Φ0
′
k (i) = i i ∈ [poly(k)]
Φ0k(i) =
{
i i ∈ V ∪ Φk(V )
Φk(i) i ∈ [poly(k)]− V − Φk(V )
For j ∈ [#V ],
Φjk(i) =
{
i i ∈ (V − Vj) ∪ Φk(V − Vj),
Φk(i) i ∈ [poly(k)]− (V − Vj)− Φk(V − Vj).
It is easy to see that
−−→˜
XY (1k, a) = Φ0
′
k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)) ≡
Φ0k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)), and Φk = Φ
#V
k . Since
−−→
XY (1k, a) =−−→˜
XY (1k, a), then
−−→
XY (1k, a)
c
= Φ0k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)). So we have
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,−−→XY (1k, a)) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φk(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)|
= |Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ0k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
#V
k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)| (9)
Following triangle inequality, we have
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ0k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
#V
k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)| ≤
#V∑
j=1
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
j
k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)| (10)
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Combining equation (8) (9) (10), we have
#V∑
j=1
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
j
k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)| ≥ 1/poly2(k)
So there exists j ∈ [#V ] such that
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
j
k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)|
≥ 1/(#V · poly2(k)) (11)
According to the definition of Φj−1k ,Φ
j
k, the
differences between them are the values of points
ij ,Φk(ij). Similarly, the only differences between
Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)) and Φjk(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)) are the ij-th
and Φk(ij)-th entries, i.e., Φ
j−1
k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))〈ij〉 =
X(1k, a), Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))〈Φk(ij)〉 = Y (1k, a),
Φjk(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))〈ij〉 = Y (1k, a), Φjk(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))〈Φk(ij)〉 =
X(1k, a).
Let
−−−−→
MXY
def
= {−−−−→MXY (1k, a)}k∈N,a∈{0,1}∗ , where−−−−→
MXY (1k, a) is defined as follows. For each d ∈ [poly(k)],
−−−−→
MXY (1k, a)〈d〉 =
{
Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))〈d〉 d 6= Φk(ij)
X(1k, a) d = Φk(ij)
The difference between
−−−−→
MXY (1k, a) and
Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)) is that
−−−−→
MXY (1k, a)〈Φk(ij)〉 = X(1k, a),
Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))〈Φk(ij)〉 = Y (1k, a). The difference
between
−−−−→
MXY (1k, a) and Φjk(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)) is that
−−−−→
MXY (1k, a)〈ij〉 = X(1k, a), Φjk(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))〈ij〉 =
Y (1k, a). Following triangle inequality, we have
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,
−−−−→
MXY (1k, a)) = 1)|+
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,−−−−→MXY (1k, a)) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
j
k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)|
≥ |Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
j
k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)| (12)
Combining (11) (12), we know that
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,
−−−−→
MXY (1k, a)) = 1)|
≥ 1/(2#V · poly2(k)) (13)
or
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,−−−−→MXY (1k, a)) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
j
k(
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)|
≥ 1/(2#V · poly2(k)) (14)
holds. Without loss of generality, we assume equation
(13) holds (in case equation (14) holds, the proof can be
done in similar way). We can construct a distinguisher D′
with an infinite sequence z = (zk)k∈N for the probability
ensembles X and Y as follows.
D′(1k, zk, a, γ): −→xy〈Φj−1k (i)〉 ← SX(1k, a) ∀i ∈
[poly1(k)],
−→xy〈Φj−1k (i)〉 ← SY (1k, a) ∀i ∈ [poly(k)] −
[poly1(k)] − {Φk(ij)}, −→xy〈Φk(ij)〉 ← γ, finally outputs
D(1k, zk, a,
−→xy).
Obviously, if γ is sampled from Y (1k, a), then −→xy is
an instance of Φj−1k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a)); if γ is sampled from
X(1k, a), then −→xy is an instance of −−−−→MXY (1k, a). So we
have
|Pr(D′(1k, zk, a,X(1k, a)) = 1)−
Pr(D′(1k, zk, a, Y (1k, a)) = 1)| =
|Pr(D(1k, zk, a,−−−−→MXY (1k, a)) = 1)−
Pr(D(1k, zk, a,Φ
j−1
k (
−−→˜
XY (1k, a))) = 1)| (15)
Combining (13) (15), we have
|Pr(D′(1k, zk, a,X(1k, a)) = 1)−
Pr(D′(1k, zk, a, Y (1k, a)) = 1)| ≥ 1/(2#V · poly2(k))
This contradicts the fact X
c
= Y . Therefore, the propo-
sition also holds in case Φk([poly1(k)]) * [poly1(k)] too.
Lemma 23. LetH = (PG, IS,DI,KG,Hash, pHash,Cheat)
be a hash family. Let n
def
= h + t. For each i ∈ [n],
HSM i
def
= {HSM i(1k)}k∈N, HSM i(1k) def=
(HSM1(1
k)〈1〉, HSM1(1k)〈i + 1〉), where HSM1(1k)
is defined in Definition 4. If H meets the following three
conditions,
1) All variables HSM1(1
k)〈i+1〉 are independent, where
i ∈ [n].
2) HSM1 = . . . = HSMh, HSMh+1 = . . . = HSMn.
3) HSM1
c
= HSMh+1.
then H has property hard subset membership.
Proof: Let π ∈ Π, X def= HSM1, Y def= HSMh+1,
Φ = (π)k∈N, poly1(.)
def
= h, poly(.)
def
= n. Following
Proposition 22, we know
−−→
XY
c
= Φ(
−−→˜
XY )
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That is
((HSM1(1
k)〈1〉, HSM1(1k)〈2〉), . . .
(HSM1(1
k)〈1〉, HSM1(1k)〈n+ 1〉)) c=
(HSM2(1
k)〈1〉, HSM2(1k)〈2〉), . . .
(HSM2(1
k)〈1〉, HSM2(1k)〈n+ 1〉))
where HSM1(1
k), HSM2(1
k) are taken from Definition
4. Note that HSM1(1
k)〈1〉 = HSM2(1k)〈1〉, so
(HSM1(1
k)〈1〉, HSM1(1k)〈2〉, . . . , HSM1(1k)〈n+1〉) c=
(HSM2(1
k)〈1〉, HSM2(1k)〈2〉, . . . , HSM2(1k)〈n+ 1〉)
i.e.,
HSM1
c
= HSM2
, which meets the requirement of the property hard
subset membership.
Loosely speaking, Lemma 23 shows that,
given a hash family H, if random variables
IS(1k,Λ)〈1〉, . . . , IS(1k,Λ)〈n〉 are independent,
IS(1k,Λ)〈1〉, . . . , IS(1k,Λ)〈h〉 sample x˙ from LR˙Λ
in the same way , IS(1k,Λ)〈h + 1〉, . . . , IS(1k,Λ)〈n〉
sample x¨ from LR¨Λ in the same way, LR˙Λ and LR¨Λ
are computationally indistinguishable, then H has hard
subset membership.
6.3 Reducing To Constructing Considerably Simpler
Hash
In this section, we reduce constructing SPHDHCt,h to
constructing considerably simpler hash.
Definition 24 (smooth projective hash family that holds
properties distinguishability and hard subset member-
ship). H = (PG, IS,DI,KG,Hash, pHash) is a smooth
projective hash family that holds properties distinguishability
and hard subset membership (SPHDH), if and only if H is
specified as follows
• The algorithms PG, DI , KG, Hash, and pHash are
specified as same as in SPHDHCt,h’s definition, i.e.,
Definition 4.
• The instance-sampler IS is a PPT algorithm that takes a
security parameter k, a family parameter Λ, a work mode
δ ∈ {0, 1} as input and outputs a instance along with
its witness (x,w), i.e., (x,w)← IS(1k,Λ, δ).
Correspondingly, we define relations RΛ, R˙Λ, R¨Λ as
follows. R˙Λ
def
= ∪k∈NRang(IS(1k,Λ, 0)), R¨Λ def=
∪k∈NRang(IS(1k,Λ, 1)), RΛ def= R˙Λ ∪ R¨Λ.
and H has the following properties
1) The properties projection and distinguishability are spec-
ified as same as in SPHDHCt,h’s definition, i.e., Def-
inition 4.
2) Smoothness. Intuitively speaking, it requires that for
any instance x¨ ∈ LR¨Λ , the hash value of x¨ is un-
obtainable unless its hash key is known. That is, the
two probability ensembles Sm1
def
= {Sm1(1k)}k∈N
and Sm2
def
= {Sm2(1k)}k∈N defined as follows, are
computationally indistinguishable, i.e., Sm1
c
= Sm2.
Sm1(1
k): Λ ← PG(1k), (x¨, w¨) ← IS(1k,Λ, 1),
(hk, pk) ← KG(1k,Λ, x¨), y ← Hash(1k,Λ, x¨, hk).
Finally outputs (Λ, x¨, pk, y).
Sm2(1
k): compared with Sm1(1
k), the only difference
is that y ∈U Range(Hash(1k,Λ, x¨, .)).
3) Hard Subset Membership. Intuitively speaking, it re-
quires that the instances of LR˙Λ and that of LR¨Λ
are computationally indistinguishable. That is, the two
probability ensembles Hm1
def
= {Hm1(1k)}k∈N and
Hm2
def
= {Hm2(1k)}k∈N defined as follows, are com-
putationally indistinguishable, i.e., Hm1
c
= Hm2.
Hm1(1
k): Λ← PG(1k), (x˙, w˙)← IS(1k,Λ, 0), finally
outputs (Λ, x˙).
Hm2(1
k): Λ← PG(1k), (x¨, w¨)← IS(1k,Λ, 1), finally
outputs (Λ, x¨).
It is easy to see that the projection and smoothness are
two contradictory properties. That is, for any instance x,
it holds at most one of the two. Therefore, R˙Λ ∩ R¨Λ = ∅.
Theorem 25 (reduce constructing SPHDHCt,h to con-
structing SPHDH). Given a SPHDH H, then we can effi-
ciently gain a SPHDHCt,h H.
Proof: Let H = (PG, IS,DI,KG,Hash, pHash).
First, we construct a new hash system H =
(PG, IS,DI,KG,Hash, pHash,Cheat) as follows.
• The procedures PG, DI , KG, Hash, pHash directly
take the corresponding procedures from H.
• IS(1k,Λ): For each i ∈ [h], ~a〈i〉 ← IS(1k,Λ, 0); for
each i ∈ [n]− [h], ~a〈i〉 ← IS(1k,Λ, 1); finally outputs
~a.
• Cheat(1k,Λ): For each i ∈ [n], ~a〈i〉 ← IS(1k,Λ, 0);
finally outputs ~a.
Second, we prove H is a SPHDHCt,h. From the
construction, we know that it remains to prove that H
holds properties smoothness, hard subset membership
and feasible cheating. However, this fact directly follows
Lemma 21, Lemma 23 and Lemma ??. Therefore, H is a
SPHDHCt,h.
Sometimes it is not easy to gain smoothness for a hash
family. In this case we have to construct a hash family,
defined as follows, as the first step to our goal.
Definition 26 (ǫ-universal projective hash family that
holds properties distinguishability and hard subset
membership). H = (PG, IS,DI,KG,Hash, pHash) is
a ǫ-universal projective hash family that holds properties
distinguishability and hard subset membership (ǫ-UPHDH),
if and only if H is specified as follows.
• All algorithms are specified as same as in SPHDH ’s
definition, i.e., Definition 24.
and H has the following properties
1) The properties projection, distinguishability and hard
subset membership are specified as same as in Definition
24.
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2) ǫ-universality. Intuitively speaking, it requires the
probability of guessing the hash value of x¨ is at
most ǫ. That is, for any sufficiently large k, any
Λ ∈ Range(PG(1k)), any x¨ ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ, 1)),
any pk ∈ Range(KG(1k,Λ, x¨)〈2〉), any y ∈
Range(Hash(1k,Λ, x¨, .)), it holds that
Pr(Hash(1k,Λ, x¨, HK) = y|PK = pk) ≤ ǫ
where (HK,PK) ← KG(1k,Λ, x¨), the probability is
taken over the randomness of KG.
Compared with SPHDH, ǫ-UPHDH relaxes the upper
bound of the probability of guessing the hash value of
x¨ to a higher value. Assume ǫ < 1, as [15], [32], we can
efficiently gain a SPHDH from a ǫ-UPHDH.
Theorem 27. Given a ǫ-UPHDH H˜, where ǫ < 1, then we
can efficiently gain a SPHDH H.
The way to prove this theorem is to construct a
required algorithm, which can be gained by a simply
application of the Leftover Hash Lemma (please see [39]
for this lemma). The detailed construction essentially is
the same as [15]. Considering the space, we don’t iterate
it here.
Combining Theorem 25 and Theorem 27, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 28 (reduce constructing SPHDHCt,h to con-
structing ǫ-UPHDH). Given a ǫ-UPHDH H˜, then we can
efficiently gain a SPHDHCt,h H.
7 CONSTRUCTING SPHDHCt,h
In this section, we construct SPHDHCt,h respectively
under the lattice assumption, the decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption, the decisional N -th residuosity
assumption and the decisional quadratic residuosity as-
sumption. Theorem 25 and Corollary 28 show that, to
construct a SPHDHCt,h, what we need to do is to
construct a SPHDH or construct a ǫ-UPHDH (ǫ < 1).
7.1 A Construction Under The Decisional Diffie-
Hellman Assumption
7.1.1 Background
Let Gen(1k) be an algorithm such that randomly chooses
a cyclic group and outputs the group’s description G =<
g, q, ∗ >, where g, q, ∗ respectively is the generator, the
order, the operation of the group.
The DDH problem is how to construct an algorithm
to distinguish the two probability ensembles DDH1
def
=
{DDH1(1k)}k∈N and DDH2 def= {DDH2(1k)}k∈N which
are formulate as follows.
• DDH1(1k): < g, q, ∗ >← Gen(1k), a ∈U Zq , b ∈U Zq,
c← ab, finally outputs (< g, q, ∗ >, ga, gb, gc).
• DDH2(1k): Basically operates in the same way as
DDH1(1
k) except that c ∈U Zq .
At present, there is no efficient algorithm solving the
problem. Therefore, it is assumed that DDH1
c
= DDH2.
7.1.2 Detailed Construction
We now present our DDH-based instantiation of SPHDH
as follows. For simplicity, we assume the groups gener-
ated by Gen(1k) is of prime order.
• PG(1k): Λ← Gen(1k), finally outputs Λ.
• IS(1k,Λ, δ): (g, q, ∗) ← Λ, a ∈U Zq , b ∈U Zq, x˙ ←
(ga, gb, gab), w˙ ← (a, b), c ∈U Zq, x¨ ← (ga, gb, gc),
w¨ ← (a, b), finally outputs (x˙, w˙) if δ = 0, (x¨, w¨) if
δ = 1.
• DI(1k,Λ, x, w): (g, q, ∗) ← Λ, (α, β, γ) ← x, (a, b) ←
w, if (α, β, γ) = (ga, gb, gab) holds, then outputs 0; if
(α, β) = (ga, gb) and γ 6= gab holds, then outputs 1.
• KG(1k,Λ, x): (g, q, ∗) ← Λ, (α, β, γ) ← x, u ∈U Zq,
v ∈U Zq, pk ← αugv, hk ← γuβv , finally outputs
(hk, pk).
• Hash(1k,Λ, x, hk): y ← hk, outputs y.
• pHash(1k,Λ, x, pk, w): (a, b) ← w, y ← pkb, finally
outputs y.
Lemma 29. The hash system holds the property projection.
Proof: Let (x˙, w˙) ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ, 0)). Let
(hk, pk) ∈ Range(KG(1k,Λ, x˙)). Then,
Hash(1k,Λ, x˙, hk) = Hash(1k,Λ, (ga, gb, gab), (gabugbv))
= gabugbv
pHash(1k,Λ, x˙, hk, w˙) = pHash(1k,Λ, (ga, gb, gab),
(gaugv), (a, b))
= gabugbv
That is,
Hash(1k,Λ, x˙, hk) = pHash(1k,Λ, x˙, pk, w˙)
Lemma 30. Assuming DDH is a hard problem, the hash
system holds the property smoothness.
Proof: For this system, the probability ensembles
Sm1, Sm2 mentioned in the definition of SPHDH can
be described as follows.
• Sm1(1k): Λ ← PG(1k), (g, q, ∗) ← Λ, a ∈U Zq, b ∈U
Zq, c ∈U Zq, x¨ ← (ga, gb, gc), u ∈U Zq , v ∈U Zq,
pk ← gau+v, hk ← gcu+bv, y ← hk. Finally outputs
(Λ, x¨, pk, y).
• Sm2(1k): Operates as same as Sm1(1k) with an
exception that y is generated as follows. d ∈U Zq,
y ← gd.
Because b, c, u, v are chosen uniformly and q is prime,
both cu and bv are uniformly distributed over Zq. Thus
cu + bv is uniformly distributed over Zq too. Therefore,
Sm1 ≡ Sm2.
Lemma 31. The hash system holds the property distinguisha-
bility.
The proof of this lemma is trivial, so we omit it.
Lemma 32. Assuming DDH is a hard problem, the hash
system holds the property hard subset membership.
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Proof: For this system, the probability ensembles
Hm1, Hm2 mentioned in the definition of SPHDH can
be described as follows.
• Hm1(1k): Λ ← PG(1k), (g, q, ∗)← Λ, a ∈U Zq, b ∈U
Zq, x˙← (ga, gb, gab). Finally outputs (Λ, x˙).
• Hm2(1k): Λ ← PG(1k), (g, q, ∗)← Λ, a ∈U Zq, b ∈U
Zq, c ∈U Zq, x¨← (ga, gb, gc). Finally outputs (Λ, x¨).
Obviously, Hm1
c
= Hm2.
Combining all lemmas above, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 33. Assuming DDH is a hard problem, the hash
system is a SPHDH.
7.1.3 A Concrete Protocol For OT nh Based On DDH
It’s known that the encryption scheme presented by
[17] can be used as a perfectly binding commitment
scheme. The encryption scheme is directly based on the
problem of discrete log. Since the task of solving the
problem DDH can be reduced to that of solving the
problem discrete log, the encryption scheme is based on
DDH essentially. The DDH-based commitment scheme
presented by [47] is a perfectly hiding one. Therefore,
using those two commitment schemes and our DDH-
based SPHDHCt,h, we gain a concrete protocol for OT
n
h
based only on DDH. To reach the best efficiency, we
should use the DDH of the group which is on elliptic
curves. See Section 4.5 for further discussion.
7.2 A Construction Under Lattice
7.2.1 Background
Learning with errors (LWE) is an average-case problem.
[50] shows that its hardness is implied by the worst-
case hardness of standard lattice problem for quantum
algorithms.
In lattice, the modulo operation is defined as x
mod y
def
= x − xx/yyy. Then we know x mod 1 def=
x − xxy. Let β be an arbitrary positive real number. Let
Ψβ be a probability density function whose distribution
is over [0, 1) and obtained by sampling from a normal
variable with mean 0 and standard deviation β/
√
2π and
reducing the result modulo 1, more specifically
Ψβ : [0, 1)→ R+
Ψβ(r)
def
=
∞∑
k=−∞
1
β
exp(−π(r − k
β
)2)
Given an arbitrary integer q ≥ 2, an arbitrary proba-
bility destiny function φ : [0, 1)→ R+, the discretization
of φ over Zq is defined as
φ¯ : Zq → R+
φ¯(i)
def
=
∫ (i+1/2)/q
(i−1/2)/q
φ(x)dx
LWE can be formulated as follows.
Definition 34 (LearningWith Errors). Learning with errors
problem (LWEq,χ) is how to construct an efficient algorithm
that receiving q, g,m, χ, (~ai, bi)i∈[m], outputs ~s with nonneg-
ligible probability. The input and the output is specified in the
following way.
q ← q(1k), g ← g(1k), m ← poly(1k), χ ← χ(1k), ~s ∈U
(Zq)
k . For each i ∈ [m], ~ai ∈U (Zq)k, ei ∈χ Zq, bi ←
~sT · ~ai + ei mod q.
where q, g are positive integers, χ : Zq → R+ is a
probability density function.
With respect to the hardness of LWE, [50] proves
that setting appropriate parameters, we can reduce two
worst-case standard lattice problems to LWE, which
means LWE is a very hard problem.
Lemma 35 ( [50]). Setting security parameter k to be a value
such that q is a prime, β ← β(1k), β ∈ (0, 1), and β · q >
2
√
k. Then the lattice problems SIV P and GapSV P can
be reduced to LWEq,Ψ¯β . More specifically, if there exists an
efficient (possibly quantum) algorithm that solves LWEq,Ψ¯β ,
then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm solving the
following worst-case lattice problems in the l2 norm.
• SIVP: In any lattice Λ of dimension k, find a set of k
linearly independent lattice vectors of length within at
most O˜(k/β) of optimal.
• GapSVP: In any lattice Λ of dimension m, approximate
the length of a shortest nonzero lattice vector to within
a O˜(k/β) factor.
We emphasize the fact that the reduction of Lemma 35
is quantum, which implies that any algorithm breaking
any cryptographic schemes which only based on LWE
is an algorithm solving at least one of the problems SIVP
and GapSVP.
How to precisely set the parameters as values to gain a
concrete LWE, which is as hard as required in Lemma 35
is beyond the scope of this paper. To see such examples
and more details, we recommend [50] and [48].
The instantiation of SPHDH, which we will present
soon, needs to use a LWE-based public key cryptosys-
tem presented by [22], which is a slight variant of [50]’s
cryptosystem. This cryptosystem is described as follow.
• Message space: {0, 1}.
• Setup(1k): q ← q(1k) ∧ q ∈ P ∧ q ∈ [k2, 2k2], m ←
(1 + ε)(k + 1) log q ( where ε > 0 is an arbitrary
constant), χ ← Ψ¯α(k) ∧ α(k) = o(1/(
√
k log k)) (e.g.,
α(k) = 1√
k(log k)2
). para ← (q,m, χ), finally outputs
para.
• KeyGen(1k, para): A ∈U (Zq)m×k, ~s ∈U (Zq)k,
~e ∈χ (Zq)m (which means each entry of ~e is indepen-
dently drawn from Zq according to χ), ~b ← A~s + ~e
mod q, pubk ← (A,~b), sk ← ~s, finally outputs a
public-private key pair (pubk, sk).
• Enc(.), Dec(.): Since Enc(.), Dec(.) are immaterial
to understand this paper, we omit their detailed
procedure here.
[22] shows that if LWEq,Ψ¯α is hard, choosing appro-
priate parameters, this cryptosystem holds the following
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properties.
1) It provides security against chosen plaintext attack,
though we only need semantic security here.
2) For each A ∈ (Zq)m×k, we have
Pr(~b is messy|~b ∈U (Zq)m) ≥ 1− 2/qk,
where~b is said to be messy if and only if, ∀m0,m1 ∈
{0, 1}, the statistical distance between the distri-
bution of EncA,~b(m0) and that of EncA,~b(m1) is
negligible. In other word, ~b is said to be messy
if and only if, EncA,~b(.) loses messages and so its
ciphertext can’t be decrypted using any private key
~s ∈ (Zq)k.
3) Given A ∈ (Zq)m×k and its trapdoor T ,
then there exists an efficient decision algorithm
IsMessy holds the following two property. First,
Pr(IsMessy(A, T,~b) = 0|~b ∈U (Zq)m) is negligible.
Second, ~b is indeed messy if IsMessy(A, T,~b) = 1.
7.2.2 Detailed Construction
We now present our LWE-based instantiation of SPHDH
as follows.
• PG(1k): Λ← Setup(1k), finally outputs Λ.
• IS(1k,Λ, b): (q,m, χ) ← Λ, A ∈U (Zq)m×k along
with its trapdoor T , ~s ∈U (Zq)k, ~e ∈χ (Zq)m,
x˙ ← (A,A~s + ~e mod q), w˙ ← (0, ~s), uniformly
chooses ~b ∈ (Zq)m such that IsMessy(A, T,~b) = 1
(recall that only negligible fraction of ~b are not
messy, therefore such ~b can be efficiently chosen) ,
x¨← (A,~b), w¨ ← (1, T ), finally outputs (x˙, w˙) if b = 0,
(x¨, w¨) if b = 1.
• DI(1k,Λ, x, w): (q,m, χ)← Λ, (A,~b)← x, (i, ̺)← w,
if i = 1 and IsMessy(A, ̺,~b) = 1 holds, then outputs
1; otherwise outputs 0.
• KG(1k,Λ, x): (q,m, χ) ← Λ, (A,~b) ← x, a ∈U {0, 1},
α ← EncA,~b(a), hk ← a, pk ← α, finally outputs
(hk, pk).
• Hash(1k,Λ, x, hk): (q,m, χ) ← Λ, a ← hk, finally
outputs a.
• pHash(1k,Λ, x, pk, w): (m, q, χ) ← Λ, α ← pk,
(i, ̺)← w, a← Dec̺(α), finally outputs a.
In the above construction of SPHDH, each instance
holds a matrix A, which seems expensive. However,
in the corresponding construction of SPHDHCt,h, this
overhead can be reduced by each instance vector sharing
a matrix A. We point out that it’s not secure that all
instance vectors share a matrix A. The reason is that in
this case, seeing matrix A’s trapdoor T in Step S2 of
the framework, P1 can distinguish smooth instances and
projective instances of the unchosen instance vectors,
which leads to P1 deducing P2’s private input.
Lemma 36. Assuming LWE is a hard problem, the hash
system holds the property projection.
Proof: Let x˙ = (A,~b) ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ, 0)), w˙ =
(0, ~s). Obviously, ((A,~b), ~s) is a correct public-private key
pair. Then, we have
Hash(1k,Λ, x˙, hk) = a,
pHash(1k,Λ, x˙, pk, w˙) = Dec~s(α)
= Dec~s(EncA,~b(a))
= a,
This means that for any (x˙, w˙,Λ) generated by the hash
system, it holds that
Hash(1k,Λ, x˙, hk) = pHash(1k,Λ, x˙, pk, w˙).
Lemma 37. The hash system holds the property smoothness.
Proof: For this system, the probability ensembles
Sm1, Sm2 mentioned in the definition of SPHDH can
be described as follows.
• Sm1(1k): Λ← PG(1k), (q,m, χ)← Λ, A ∈U (Zq)m×k
along with its trapdoor T , uniformly chooses ~b ∈
(Zq)
m such that IsMessy(A, T,~b) = 1, x¨ ← (A,~b),
w¨ ← (1, T ), a ∈U {0, 1}, α ← EncA,~b(a), pk ← α,
y ← a, finally outputs (Λ, x¨, pk, y).
• Sm2(1k): Operates as same as Sm1(1k) with an
exception that y ∈U {0, 1}.
Obviously, Sm1(1
k) ≡ Sm2(1k).
Lemma 38. Assuming LWE is a hard problem, the hash
system holds the property distinguishability.
Proof: Recalling the property of IsMessy, we know if
(A,~b) isn’t messy, IsMessy(A, T,~b) = 0; if (A,~b) is messy,
IsMessy(A, T,~b) = 1 with a probability close to 1. Thus,
if (x,w) ∈ R¨Λ, DI outputs 1; if (x,w) ∈ R˙Λ, DI outputs
0. DI correctly computes ζ.
Lemma 39. Assuming LWE is a hard problem, the hash
system holds the property hard subset membership.
Proof: For this system, the probability ensembles
Hm1, Hm2 mentioned in the definition of SPHDH can
be described as follows.
• Hm1(1k): Λ ← PG(1k), (q,m, χ) ← Λ, A ∈U
(Zq)
m×k along with its trapdoor T , ~s ∈U (Zq)k,
~e ∈χ (Zq)m, x˙← (A,A~s+ ~e mod q), finally outputs
(Λ, x˙).
• Hm2(1k): Λ ← PG(1k), (q,m, χ) ← Λ, A ∈U
(Zq)
m×k along with its trapdoor T , uniformly
chooses ~b ∈ (Zq)m such that IsMessy(A, T,~b) = 1,
x¨← (A,~b), finally outputs (Λ, x¨).
Obviously, Hm1
c
= Hm2.
Combining Lemma 35 and above lemmas, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 40. If SIV P or GapSV P is a hard problem, the
hash system is a SPHDH.
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7.2.3 A Concrete Protocol For OT nh With Security
Against Quantum Algorithms
The security proof of the framework guarantees that,
any adversary breaking the framework is an algorithm
breaking at least one of cryptographic tools used in
the framework. Moreover, it’s generally believed that
lattice-based cryptography resists quantum attacks [41].
Therefore, to gain an instantiation of our framework with
security against quantum algorithms, it suffices to adopt
lattice-based instantiations of the cryptographic tools.
Thus, it remains to find a IHC and a IBC with such
security level. Though there exists general methods to
construct perfectly binding commitments and perfectly
hiding commitments from one-way functions (or one-
way permutations) (see [23] Chapter 4), the resulting
lattice-based commitments seem too expensive. Thus,
other approach is needed.
First, based on the result of [22], we can get a relatively
efficient statically binding commitment.
Lemma 41 ( [22]). There exists an efficient algorithm for
the lattice-based cryptosystem mentioned early such that, for
all but at most negligible fraction of public key generated by
KeyGen, given a trapdoor for the matrix A, and a public key
(A,AT~s + ~e), it can efficiently extract the unique secret key
~s.
The lattice-based cryptosystem can be used as a stat-
ically binding commitment in the following way. In
commit phase, P1 sends a public key (A,~b) along with
EA,~b(m) to P2. The computationally hiding directly fol-
lows the security level of the cryptosystem. In reveal
phase, P1 sends the trapdoor of A, the value m, and
the randomness used in commit phase to P2. Following
Lemma 41, almost all legitimate public keys, respectively,
correspond to a unique private key. This guarantees that
an encryption relative to legitimate public keys have a
unique decryption. Therefore, it holds statically binding.
Second, combining the works of [2], [25], [29], [40],
we can get a relatively efficient statically hiding com-
mitment. [29] presents a efficient way to construct stati-
cally hiding commitments from any collision-free hash.
Assuming one of the lattice problems SIV P and SV P is
hard, [25] shows that [2]’s lattice-based hash of suitably
chosen parameters is collision-free. Under the assump-
tion that GapSV P 2
O˜(n)
is hard in the worst case, [40] later
also shows that the lattice-based hash is collision-free.
Therefore, applying [29]’s method to [2]’s hash, we get
a lattice-based statically hiding commitment.
Now we can gain a concrete protocol for OT nh with
security against quantum algorithms, this is summarized
by the following theorem.
Theorem 42. Assuming that one of the lattice problems
SIV P and GapSV P is hard for quantum algorithms,
instantiating the OT nh framework with the lattice-based
SPHDHCt,h, and the lattice-based commitment schemes (no
matter the ones that are got by applying the general method
or the ones we suggests above), the resulting concrete protocol
for OT nh is secure against quantum algorithms.
7.3 A Construction Under The Decisional N-th
Residuosity Assumption
7.3.1 Verifiable-ǫ-universal Projective Hash Family
In this section, we will build a instantiation of ǫ-
UPHDH (ǫ < 1) from a instantiation of a hash system
called verifiable-ǫ-universal projective hash family by
[32]. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce the definition
of this hash system.
Definition 43 (verifiable-ǫ-universal projective hash fam-
ily, [32]). H = (PG, IS, IT,KG,Hash, pHash) is a ǫ-
universal projective hash family (ǫ-VUPH), if and only if H
is specified as follows.
• The algorithms PG, IS, KG, Hash, pHash are speci-
fied as same as in ǫ-UPHDH’s definition, i.e., Definition
26.
• IS is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k,
a family parameter Λ as input and outputs a tuple, i.e.,
(w˙, x˙, x¨)← IS(1k,Λ).
• IT is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k,
a family parameter Λ, two instances as input and outputs
a bit , i.e., b← IT (1k,Λ, x1, x2).
and H has the following properties
1) The properties projection, ǫ-universality are specified as
same as that in ǫ-UPHDH’s definition, i.e., Definition
26.
2) Verifiability. First, for any sufficiently large k, any Λ ∈
Range(PG(1k)), any (w˙, x˙, x¨) ∈ Range(IS(1k,Λ)),
it holds that IT (1k,Λ, x˙, x¨) = IT (1k,Λ, x¨, x˙) = 1.
Second, for any sufficiently large k, any (Λ, x1, x2) such
that IT (1k,Λ, x1, x2) = 1, at least one of x1, x2 is ǫ-
universal.
It is easy to see that verifiability guarantees any in-
stance x holds at most one of the properties projec-
tion and universality. Therefore, we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 44. Let H = (PG, IS, IT,KG,Hash, pHash) be a
ǫ-universal projective hash family, then
L˙ ∩ L¨ = ∅
where L˙
def
= {x˙|Λ ← PG(1k), (w˙, x˙, x¨) ← IS(1k,Λ)} and
L¨
def
= {x¨|Λ← PG(1k), (w˙, x˙, x¨)← IS(1k,Λ)}.
7.3.2 Background
Let Gen(1k) be an algorithm that operates as follows.
• Gen(1k): (p, q) ∈U {(p, q)|(p, q) ∈ (P,P), p, q >
2, |p| = |q| = k, gcd(pq, (p− 1)(q − 1)) = 1}, N ← pq,
finally outputs N .
The problem decisional N-th residuosity (DNR), first
presented by [46], is how to construct an algorithm
to distinguish two probability ensembles DNR1
def
=
{DNR1(1k)}k∈N and DNR2 def= {DNR2(1k)}k∈N which
are formulate as follows.
24
• DNR1(1k): N ← Gen(1k), a ∈U Z∗N2 , b ← aN
mod N2, finally outputs (N, b).
• DNR2(1k): N ← Gen(1k), b ∈U Z∗N2 , finally outputs
(N, b).
The DNR assumption is that there is no efficient
algorithm solving the problem. In other words, it is
assumed that DNR1
c
= DNR2.
Our instantiation of ǫ-UPHDH is build from a DNR-
based instantiation of ε-VUPH (ε < 1) presented by [32].
The instantiation of ε-VUPH is stated as follows.
• PG(1k): N ← Gen(1k), a ∈U Z∗N2 , T ← Np2 logNq,
g ← aN ·T mod N2, Λ← (N, g), finally outputs Λ.
• IS(1k,Λ): (N, g) ← Λ, r, v ∈U Z∗N , w ← r, x˙ ← gr
mod N2, x¨ ← x˙(1 + vN) mod N2, finally outputs
(w, x˙, x¨).
• IT (1k,Λ, x˙, x¨): (N, g) ← Λ. Checks that N > 22k,
g, x˙ ∈ Z∗N2 . d← x¨/x˙ mod N2 and checks N |(d− 1).
v ← (d− 1)/N and checks gcd(v,N) = 1. Outputs 1
if all the test pass and 0 otherwise.
• KG(1k,Λ): (N, g) ← Λ, hk ∈U ZN2 , pk ← ghk
mod N2, finally outputs (hk, pk).
• Hash(1k,Λ, x, hk): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← xhk mod N2,
finally outputs y.
• pHash(1k,Λ, x, pk, w): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← pkw
mod N2, finally outputs y.
7.3.3 Detailed Construction
We now present our DNR-based instantiation of ǫ-
UPHDH (ǫ < 1) as follows.
• PG(1k): N ← Gen(1k), a ∈U Z∗N2 , T ← Np2 logNq,
g ← aN ·T mod N2, Λ← (N, g), finally outputs Λ.
• IS(1k,Λ, δ): (N, g) ← Λ, r ∈U Z∗N , x˙← gr mod N2,
w˙ ← (r, 0), v ∈U Z∗N , x¨ ← gr(1 + vN) mod N2,
w¨ ← (r, v), finally outputs (x˙, w˙) if δ = 0, (x¨, w¨) if
δ = 1.
• DI(1k,Λ, x, w): (N, g)← Λ, (r, v)← w,
1) if v = 0 mod N , operates as follows: checks
that N > 22k, g, x ∈ Z∗N2 , r ∈ Z∗N , x = gr
mod N2. Outputs 0 if all the test pass.
2) if v 6= 0 mod N , operates as follows: checks
that N > 22k, g, x ∈ Z∗N2 , r ∈ Z∗N , x = gr(1+vn)
mod N2. Outputs 1 if all the test pass.
• KG(1k,Λ, x): (N, g) ← Λ, hk ∈U ZN2 , pk ← ghk
mod N2, finally outputs (hk, pk).
• Hash(1k,Λ, x, hk): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← xhk mod N2,
finally outputs y.
• pHash(1k,Λ, x, pk, w): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← pkw
mod N2, finally outputs y.
Theorem 45. Assuming DNR is a hard problem, the hash
system is a ǫ-UPHDH (ǫ < 1).
Proof: It is easy to see that the hash system directly
inherits properties ε-universality and projection from the
instantiation of ǫ-VUPH. Following Lemma 44, the hash
system holds property distinguishability. It remains to
prove that the hash system holds the property hard
subset membership.
For this system, the probability ensembles Hm1, Hm2
mentioned in the definition of ǫ-UPHDH can be de-
scribed as follows.
• Hm1(1k): Λ ← PG(1k), (N, g) ← Λ, r ∈U Z∗N , x˙ ←
gr mod N2. Finally outputs (Λ, x˙).
• Hm2(1k): Λ ← PG(1k), (N, g) ← Λ, r, v ∈U Z∗N ,
x¨← gr(1 + vN) mod N2. Finally outputs (Λ, x¨).
It is clear that Hm1
c
= Hm2. Therefore, the hash system
holds the property hard subset membership.
7.4 A Construction Under The Decisional Quadratic
Residuosity Assumption
We reuse Gen(1k) defined in section 7.3.2. Let JN be
the subgroup of Z∗N of elements with Jacobi symbol 1.
The problem decisional quadratic residuosity (DQR) is
how to construct an algorithm to distinguish the two
probability ensembles DQR1
def
= {DQR1(1k)}k∈N and
DQR2
def
= {DQR2(1k)}k∈N which are formulated as
follows.
• DQR1(1k): N ← Gen(1k), x ∈U JN , finally outputs
(N, x).
• DQR2(1k): N ← Gen(1k), r ∈U Z∗N , x← r2 mod N ,
finally outputs (N, x).
The DQR assumption is that there is no efficient
algorithm solving the problem. That is, it is assumed
that DQR1
c
= DQR2.
As in section 7.3, the hash system we aim to achieve
is an instantiation of ǫ-UPHDH. We will build it on
an instantiation of ε-VUPH presented by [32] which is
constructed under DQR assumption. Considering the
space, we do not iterate the instantiation of ε-VUPH
here, and directly present our instantiation of ǫ-UPHDH
as follows.
• PG(1k): (p, q) ∈U (P,P), where |p| = |q| = k, p <
q < 2p−1, p = q = 3 mod 4, a ∈U Z∗N , T ← 2plogNq,
g ← a2·T mod N , Λ← (N, g), finally outputs Λ.
• IS(1k,Λ, δ): (N, g) ← Λ, r ∈U ZN , x˙ ← gr mod N ,
x¨ ← N − gr mod N , w¨ ← r , finally outputs (x˙, w˙)
if δ = 0, (x¨, w¨) if δ = 1.
• DI(1k,Λ, x, w): (N, g)← Λ, r ← w; checks that N >
22k, g, x ∈ Z∗N . Outputs 0, if x = gr mod N and all
the test pass. Outputs 1, if x = N − gr mod N and
all the test pass.
• KG(1k,Λ, x): (N, g) ← Λ, hk ∈U ZN , pk ← ghk
mod N , finally outputs (hk, pk).
• Hash(1k,Λ, x, hk): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← xhk mod N ,
finally outputs y.
• pHash(1k,Λ, x, pk, w): (N, g) ← Λ, y ← pkw
mod N , finally outputs y.
Theorem 46. Assuming DQR is a hard problem, the hash
system is a ǫ-UPHDH, where ǫ < 1.
This theorem can be proven in a similar way in which
Theorem 45 is proven.
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